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Articles
FOURTH AMENDMENT GLOSS
Aziz Z. Huq
ABSTRACT—Conventional wisdom suggests that a constitutional right
should be defined so as to effectively constrain government actors. A right
defined in terms of what state actors routinely do would seem to impose in
practice an ineffectual brake on much intrusive state action—and so seems
pointless. Nevertheless, in defining Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme
Court frequently draws on the practice of contemporaneous government
actors to define the constitutional floor for police action. The actions of the
regulated thus define the content of regulation. This Article isolates and
analyzes this seemingly paradoxical judicial practice, which it labels “Fourth
Amendment gloss,” by analogy to methodological practices elsewhere in
constitutional law. The latter is examined through a comparison to a similar,
albeit not identical, mode of reasoning used in separation of powers cases.
The justifications for gloss in the latter domain are more fully developed and
hence provide useful benchmarks for evaluation of Fourth Amendment
gloss. The Article’s first aim is descriptive—to catalog the various ways in
which “gloss,” or official practice, is deployed across the Court’s search and
seizure case law. This exercise shows that many frequently exercised search
and seizure powers have been constitutionally defined in terms of official
practice. The Article’s second aim is to ask whether judicial reliance on such
gloss can be justified. There are three general justifications for the use of
official practice as a source of law in constitutional interpretation. These can
be labeled the acquiescence, Burkean, and settlement justifications. A careful
examination of the empirical and theoretical contexts of the Fourth
Amendment suggests, however, that none of these three justifications
supports gloss’s use as a way to define lawful searches and seizures. If gloss
persists today, therefore, it is for institutional and ideological reasons—not
because it is theoretically warranted. Given this conclusion, the Article offers
ways to limit the error costs associated with the use of Fourth Amendment
gloss.
AUTHOR—Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University
of Chicago Law School. My thanks to Brandon Garrett, Orin Kerr, and
John Rappaport for terrific comments, and to Kendra Doty, Jacob
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Wentzel, and other editors of the Northwestern University Law Review
for their terrific work on the piece. Work on this article was supported by
the Frank J. Cicero Fund. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional rights supposedly constrain government actors. 1 To
restrain the state in some meaningful way, a right must place out of lawful
bounds some activities that government would otherwise do or else require
some action that government would otherwise abjure. The U.S. Constitution
largely enumerates the first, negative, kind of right against government
interference. 2 So to define those constitutional rights in terms of what the
government ordinarily does might seem an exercise in futility. After all, a
right defined in terms of ordinary state practice would engender no

1 This explains Professor Ronald Dworkin’s canonical formulation of rights as “trumps.” RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 29 (1974) (describing rights as “side constraints”).
2 The U.S. Constitution largely adumbrates negative rights. But cf. David P. Currie, Positive and
Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) (“From the beginning there have
been cases in which the Supreme Court, sometimes very persuasively, has found in negatively
phrased provisions constitutional duties that can in some sense be described as positive.”).
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meaningful gain in liberty. 3 Why, one might plausibly wonder, would
anyone bother to write down such a right in the first place? Under what
circumstances, one might ask, would such a right likely be violated?
This Article concerns a zone of constitutional rights jurisprudence that
seems to disobey this seemingly foundational presupposition. When
delineating the Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Supreme Court frequently draws on the official practice of
regulated government actors today as a source of constitutional meaning. I
call this reliance on official practice “Fourth Amendment gloss,” by rough
analogy to the judicial practice of looking to post-ratification interbranch
dynamics as a source of “historical gloss” in separation of powers disputes.4
The analogy is not, to be clear, an exact one. There are important
differences in the circumstances in which Fourth Amendment issues arise.
Whereas the structural constitutional context typically involves a small
number of institutions engaged in iterated interactions, the Fourth
Amendment concerns thousands of dispersed officers and magistrates acting
in disarticulated parallel. But the analogy between doctrinal fields is still a
useful one, and the contextual differences are easy to exaggerate. Some
structural constitutional issues arise in dispersed and iterative contexts—
questions of removal authority and commandeering, for example—so the
contextual difference should not be overstated. Moreover, it is hard to see
why there should be an acoustic separation between the methodological
foundations of different veins of constitutional interpretation. Choices of
hermeneutic method are generally conceived as general—not clausespecific—in character. By analyzing how the precisely honed and
extensively analyzed justifications for judicial reliance on official practice in
the separation of powers context translate across those differences to the
Fourth Amendment context, it is possible to gain new perspective on the
epistemic and legal value of official practice as a guide to search and seizure
law.
That perspective yields deflationary results: The analogies and parallels
explored here provide powerful reasons to conclude that judicial reliance on
“gloss” in the Fourth Amendment context is not as well supported as it is in
other domains. If the notion of Fourth Amendment gloss seems
counterintuitive, then that is as it should be.
3

Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1315 (1984) (“Having a constitutional right to perform a given act means,
at least, that one may perform that act without governmental interference.”).
4 See Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1523 (2018)
(book review) (discussing the role of “historical ‘gloss’” in separation of powers jurisprudence); see
also infra Section I.A (exploring the scholarly literature on separation of powers gloss).
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My first aim in this Article is thus descriptive: I want to isolate the
significant role that official practice plays in one vital part of our
constitutional law of policing. 5 I also want to cast a spotlight on how the
Court defines what the state can do in terms of what the state in fact does.
Official practice as a basis for Fourth Amendment protection has played a
pivotal role in recent cases concerning the interaction of new technologies
and the law of search and seizure. Although I will substantiate this point by
a careful analysis of the overall doctrine, it is useful to introduce the idea of
Fourth Amendment gloss with two recent examples, both of which concern
the impact of technology on constitutional protection from state searches and
seizures. Although Fourth Amendment gloss did not prevail in both cases,
they still crisply illustrate the kinds of roles that it can play.
First, in Carpenter v. United States, the Court considered whether
government acquisition of cell-site locational data from a suspect’s
telecommunications provider counted as a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment. 6 For a majority of the Court, the case concerned “a new
phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person’s past movements through the
record of his cell phone signals.” 7 Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority
opinion hinged on a distinction between cell-site locational data and other
kinds of information historically obtained by the government without a
warrant. He stressed that “novel circumstances” required a fresh
consideration of the principle that records held by third parties fell outside
the Fourth Amendment’s scope. 8 History thus had no bite.
In contrast, the main dissent by Justice Anthony Kennedy viewed the
essential continuity of warrantless acquisition of cell-site data and previous
investigative practices as a legitimating basis for the government’s action.
Cell-site acquisition, Justice Kennedy stressed, was both “reasonable” and
“accepted.” 9 He then placed emphasis on “the longstanding rule that the
Government may use compulsory process to compel persons to disclose
documents and other evidence within their possession and control.” 10 Such
use of compulsory disclosure was “well established,” explained Justice
5 I am focused here on the Fourth Amendment. Official practice plays a role in other criminal
procedure domains. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (relying on the American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice to define constitutionally adequate defense counsel conduct
in a capital case). The analysis here might be extended to those domains, but I do not pursue that
possibility here.
6 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–15 (2018) (considering whether acquisition of cell-site locational data
from a third-party data provider constitutes a “search”).
7 Id. at 2216.
8 Id. at 2217.
9 Id. at 2223 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 2228.
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Kennedy, “even when the records contain private information.” 11 Indeed, this
practice was so entrenched that it had created a “reliance” interest on the part
of police, “state and federal grand juries, state and federal administrative
agencies, and state and federal legislative bodies.” 12 Hence, for Justice
Kennedy, the sheer fact of continuous usage legitimated a state practice
under the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding intervening technological
change.
A central difference between the Carpenter majority and its dissent was
the extent to which the Justices were willing to perceive warrantless
acquisition of cell-site data as a (necessarily legitimate) extension of an older
practice, as distinct from a novelty requiring fresh thinking. Carpenter is
unusual only insofar as the argument from historical practice failed.
A similar choice between the embrace of historical continuity and the
recognition of a technological rupture informs the various opinions in United
States v. Jones, a second case concerning new means of information
acquisition. 13 Jones unanimously held that police could not engage in the
warrantless placement and tracking of a global positioning system (GPS)
device on a suspect’s vehicle because, as in Carpenter, such conduct
constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. 14 Whereas Justice
Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion framed the case as an application of a
longstanding trespass-based rule, the concurring opinions of Justices Sonia
Sotomayor and Samuel Alito stressed the issue’s novelty—and, critically,
the absence of any tradition of analogous police practice. 15 Stated otherwise,
for the concurring Justices in Jones, as for the majority in Carpenter, the
absence of an analogous historical gloss was fatal to the government’s case
for the validity of warrantless GPS tracking under the Fourth Amendment.
Jones and Carpenter are not methodological outliers. Official practice
plays a central role across a large swath of Fourth Amendment law in three
different ways. First, it has played a central role in titrating the authority that
police have to make arrests without a warrant. Second, it has configured the
path of Fourth Amendment law in respect to vehicular stops. And third, it
has been invoked to justify and also to constrain the supply of remedies for
11

Id. at 2228–29.
Id. at 2229 (citations omitted).
13 565 U.S. 400, 404–11 (2012).
14 Id. at 404.
15 Compare id. at 405 (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law
trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”), with id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“[T]he same technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance
techniques . . . also affect the [Fourth Amendment threshold] test by shaping the evolution of societal
privacy expectations.”), and id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (accusing the Court of
“disregard[ing] what is really important”: the use of a GPS device, by focusing on the trespass).
12
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constitutional violations in the context of criminal trials. 16 In these cases,
practice’s relevance has often impinged more acutely than in Jones and
Carpenter. Or at least this is what the descriptive element of my project
suggests.
The Article’s second contribution is evaluative—Is Fourth Amendment
gloss, I ask, a good idea? To analyze that question, I draw on larger
methodological debates in structural constitutional law. Here, the idea of
gloss has received far more sustained attention. Of course, the kind of official
practice at issue in structural constitutional cases is quite distinct from the
sort at stake in Fourth Amendment cases. But the justifications for reliance
on practice have been much more extensively studied in respect to the
separation of powers. And there is no reason to think that interpretive
foundations should vary between constitutional provisions.
My aim here is to benefit from that growing scholarship on historical
gloss in the separation of powers context by asking whether the justifications
identified there can be translated over to the (less well explored) Fourth
Amendment context. To this end, I identify three theoretical grounds for
giving weight to official practice as a source of constitutional meaning. All
three justifications are quite general in form. First, gloss might be evidence
of acquiescence to a practice by official actors who have freestanding
authority to interpret the Constitution. Giving weight to their judgments
appropriately implicates the Constitution’s distribution of interpretive
authority across distinct institutions. Second, gloss may be the distillate of
experience over years and generations. As such, it may represent a kind of
Burkean wisdom not to be lightly dismissed. Third, gloss may be valuable
simply because it represents a focal equilibrium for officials and citizens. As
such, it may serve as a settlement to enable coordination around the defense
of constitutional norms. If after having accounted for the three broad grounds
of acquiescence, epistemic value, and settlement value as justifications for
Fourth Amendment gloss, there remains an explanatory gap, it might be
plausible to conclude that such a gap cannot be filled.
These three theoretical foundations for the use of official practice as a
source of constitutional meaning largely fail, I conclude, to provide a
satisfying foundation for the practice of Fourth Amendment gloss. The
acquiescence justification works in the separation of powers context because
coordinate branches of the federal government can provide legitimating
acquiescence to each other’s practices. 17 But in the Fourth Amendment
context, it is not easy to identify a class of official actors charged with
16
17

706

These points of doctrine are developed infra in Part II.
See infra Section III.A.

113:701 (2019)

Fourth Amendment Gloss

making careful determinations of constitutionality in response to new forms
of search and seizure. The dialogic process of acquiescence, therefore, falls
short in this context. The Burkean justification, in contrast, proves to be
incompatible with the political economy, information economy, and history
of the actors regulated by the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the possibility that
gloss might serve as coordinating settlement fails to fit observed usages of
official practice presently found in the law reports.
Just because all three of the most plausible justifications for Fourth
Amendment gloss fail does not mean that judges will cease to engage in the
practice. Indeed, powerful institutional and ideological compulsions support
the practice, quite independent of its merits. Given the likelihood that courts
will continue to rely on gloss, even when doing so is normatively unjustified,
I conclude by sketching how the practice’s error costs might at least be
cabined.
Despite its pervasive use, the practice of Fourth Amendment gloss
remains peripheral to scholarly debates. Perhaps this relative marginality
arises because gloss matters most to the mechanics of Fourth Amendment
law only after the Court has determined what counts as a “search.” The
threshold topic tends to receive the lion’s share of scholarly attention. 18 Less
well studied are the rather unglamorous procedural questions of what steps
the Government must take to make a search lawful and what remedies follow
when these steps are not taken.
While legal scholars have not addressed Fourth Amendment gloss
systematically, my analysis here draws inspiration from, and extends, earlier
scholarship on searches and seizures. In 1974, Professor Anthony
Amsterdam expressed “hope for the prospect of police self-regulation
through the process of departmental rulemaking,” but cautioned that
“considerable nudging” from the courts would be required for this to
18 A sampling of the most prominent scholarship includes William Baude & James Y. Stern,
The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1877 (2016) (reasoning
that, under the positive law model, a court may decide to apply the waiver of positive law rights to
Fourth Amendment protections for threshold search and seizure questions); Sherry F. Colb, What Is
a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy,
55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002) (asking “what is a search?” when determining what Fourth
Amendment protections apply based on “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy”); Orin S. Kerr, Four
Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 528 (2007) (explaining Fourth
Amendment doctrine as including two questions: (1) what is a search, and (2) under what
circumstances is a search reasonable); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual
Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV.
205, 211 (including “perceived intrusiveness” of a search as relevant to reasonable expectations of
privacy per Fourth Amendment doctrine); and Richard M. Re, Fourth Amendment Fairness,
116 MICH. L. REV. 1409, 1413 (2018) (contending “a search or seizure is unreasonable when any
principle that permitted it would be one that a Fourth Amendment rights holder could reasonably
reject”).
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happen. 19 Professor Amsterdam was not concerned, though, with practice as
opposed to formal rulemaking and so does not provide an exact precursor to
my contribution (although his seminal paper casts a necessarily long shadow
over any academic inquiry into the Fourth Amendment). A more closely
path-marking antecedent is Professor David Sklansky’s work on the role of
common law concepts from the time of the Fourth Amendment’s ratification
in the Fourth Amendment law of the 1990s. 20 As I detail below, gloss is
distinct from the common law materials with which Professor Sklansky
reckoned. 21 But his general approach of situating the Fourth Amendment in
the larger body of constitutional doctrine is admirable and merits attention.
A more recent precursor to my analysis is Professor Anna Lvovsky’s recent
historicizing intervention, which focuses on the midcentury origins of
judicial deference to police expertise. 22 She approaches some of the same
issues as my analysis here—in particular the epistemic arguments for gloss—
but does so from a historical perspective rather than a doctrinal one. Her
interest is in understanding the origins of certain judicial practices and not
analyzing their coherence within the larger fabric of constitutional doctrine.
Professors Sklansky’s and Lvovsky’s works provide intellectual coordinates
from which the present inquiry presses forward. 23
The paper proceeds in four steps. In the first Part, I set out the uses of
gloss in other domains of constitutional law. I tease out three distinct
rationales for turning to observed practice as a source of constitutional
meaning. These rationales are intended to serve as a framework for
evaluating Fourth Amendment gloss. The second Part then makes a detailed
19 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 379–80
(1974). But Professor Amsterdam’s project is rather different from mine. He expressed the hope that the
Court would require policing be “conducted pursuant to and in conformity with either legislation or police
departmental rules and regulations” to comply with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 416. I am focused here
on the actual (rather than recommended) use of practice (rather than regulation) in the doctrine. Hence,
my project here is quite different from Professor Amsterdam’s.
20 David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739,
1743 (2000) (noting that the Court “has made the principal criterion for identifying violations of the
Fourth Amendment ‘whether a particular governmental action . . . was regarded as an unlawful
search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999)).
21 See infra text accompanying notes 82–91.
22 Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995,
1998–99 (2017) (“Starting in the 1950s, judges came to rely on the promise of police expertise—the
notion that trained, experienced officers develop rarefied and reliable insight into crime—to expand
police authority in multiple areas of the law.”).
23 Another more recent article takes up the question of how and when local government practice
should be relevant to constitutional adjudication. See Brandon L. Garrett, Local Evidence in
Constitutional Interpretation, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (documenting ways in which
the courts have looked at local practice to define constitutional norms).
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descriptive case for the pivotal role that gloss has played across the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudential waterfront. I aim to show that gloss shapes many
commonly employed rules of Fourth Amendment law––in particular those
concerning warrantless arrests, searches of individuals, and vehicular stops;
it also shapes the Court’s remedial choices. Part Three considers whether the
available theoretical rationales for gloss—identified in other domains of
constitutional law—support its use in the Fourth Amendment context. The
result here is largely negative: few normatively persuasive grounds exist for
using gloss in the Fourth Amendment context. Finally, I turn in Part Four to
the question of what follows from this negative assessment. I suggest that
courts will continue to employ gloss for ideological and institutional reasons,
but there are ways to mitigate the associated costs.
I.

USING GLOSS IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

This Part explores the scope and function of gloss as evidence of
meaning in constitutional jurisprudence. This entails first offering a
definition of gloss as it has emerged in other domains of constitutional law.
I develop this definition through an explication of the reasons the Court and
sympathetic scholars have tendered for reliance on historical practice.
A. Gloss as a Source of Constitutional Meaning
The idea of a post-ratification institutional practice as an illuminating
gloss on open-textured constitutional provisions is most closely associated
with Justice Felix Frankfurter’s concurrence in the Steel Seizure case. 24 In
that opinion, Justice Frankfurter defined gloss as “a systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never
before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold
the Constitution.” 25 This definition is not without its ambiguities.26 Still,
Justice Frankfurter’s idea of gloss can be usefully decomposed into three
constituent parts using his own verbal formulation as a starting point: (1) a
historical practice by an official actor akin to the President; (2) that is
temporally durable rather than momentary and fleeting; and (3) that has been
recognized and endorsed by other official institutions, such as Congress. This
definition is best understood as a core case of gloss or practice that is useful
to orient discussion as an initial matter. It is not meant to exclude the
24 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). For an account of the provenance of the term, see Curtis A. Bradley &
Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413,
418 (2012).
25 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
26 See infra text accompanying notes 41–46 (documenting ambiguities).
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possibility that an official practice be legally relevant even if it lacks one of
the three conditions. Indeed, an important implication of Part II is that
official practice can turn out to count as gloss without strictly satisfying all
of Justice Frankfurter’s requirements. At the same time, the definition is
useful insofar as it clarifies that gloss should be understood as distinct from
the ideas of deference, which does not turn on the observation that a practice
of some sort exists, or cognate notions.
Justice Frankfurter’s idea of historical gloss has been repeatedly pressed
into service in the Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence. It is “an
important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that
practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the
founding era.” 27 For instance, gloss plays a role in the Court’s judgments on
recess appointments, 28 interbranch commissions (such as the U.S.
Sentencing Commission), 29 the pocket veto, 30 the unwritten executive power
to preempt state laws on foreign affairs grounds,31 and the Executive’s power
to “recognize” other nations. 32 In all these jurisprudential domains, the postratification practices of Executive Branch actors—provided they are open,
notorious, and uncontested—do double-duty as evidence of how
constitutional ambiguity should be resolved. In other words, gloss operates
as positive evidence of constitutionality.
At other times, courts take the absence of historical practice as proof of
the absence of constitutional authority. Examples of gloss’s negative use can
be found in the Court’s Article III and anti-commandeering jurisprudences.
For example, when considering a federal statute that purported to reopen a
federal court’s final judgment, the Court observed that there was “no [other]
instance in which Congress has attempted to set aside the final judgment of
27

NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
Id.
29 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400–01 (1989) (using gloss to conclude that the
Constitution did not bar “judicial participation in certain extrajudicial activity”).
30 The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established practice is a
consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this
character.”).
31 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“[T]he historical gloss on the
‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President’s ‘vast share
of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
32 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (“[T]he President since
the founding has exercised this unilateral power to recognize new states—and the Court has endorsed
the practice.”). For a skeptical view of gloss’s role in Zivotofsky, see Curtis A. Bradley, Agora:
Reflections on Zivotofsky v. Kerry: Historical Gloss, the Recognition Power, and Judicial Review,
109 AJIL UNBOUND 2, 2 (2016) (“[W]hereas in some cases historical practice shapes perceptions
about other interpretive materials, in Zivotofsky II the principal direction of influence was the other
way around.”).
28
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an Article III court by retroactive legislation,” a “prolonged reticence” that
“would be amazing if such interference were not understood to be
constitutionally proscribed.” 33 Similarly, in fashioning an anticommandeering prohibition to protect states’ sovereign prerogatives from
federal takeover, the Court has repeatedly underscored the idea that an
absence of historical practice lends credence to a constitutional challenge. 34
Most recently, in a challenge to the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act, Justice Alito echoed his Jones opinion and reaffirmed the
salience of gloss’s absence by drawing attention to the “unprecedented” and
“isolated” nature of the federal commandeering at issue there. 35
Positive and negative uses of gloss are not identical. The inference
taken from an absence of practice tends to be more narrowly gauged than the
inference drawn from affirmative practice. The absence of practice is
generally taken solely as circumstantial evidence that many generations of
political leaders believed a power to be without constitutional authority,
which must be considered in light of other potential reasons for government
inaction. 36 The Court has never even hinted that desuetude might directly
cause the absence of authority. It has never, that is, made a symmetrical
claim to Justice Frankfurter’s assertion in his Steel Seizure concurrence that
the mere persistence of desuetude can directly create a new species of
institutional power that did not previously exist. Inaction, then, is not as
powerful a gloss as action.
So deployed, gloss has spilled over only intermittently beyond
separation of powers and federalism jurisprudence. In the 2016 case of
Evenwel v. Abbott, for instance, the Court adjudicated a challenge to states’
reliance on total population, as opposed to the population of eligible voters,
for legislative districting. 37 The Court upheld Texas’s practice of using total
population by looking to the “settled practice” of “all 50 States and countless
local jurisdictions . . . for decades, even centuries.” 38 In First Amendment
33

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995).
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 175–76 (1992). Similar arguments are found in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012) (plurality opinion) (noting that “the lack
of historical precedent” is a “telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem” (alteration in
original) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505
(2010))).
35 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018).
36 Of course, the absence of legislative action can be explained by many factors in a
governmental system characterized by veto-gates and novel policy crises. Leah M. Litman,
Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1429–48 (2017) (cataloging alternative causes of
novelty).
37 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016).
38 Id.
34
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cases, too, the Court has accounted for “widespread and time-tested” state
practice in evaluating the constitutionality of an election regulation.39
Despite being rather theoretically underwhelming—the Court, that is, saying
nothing about why historical practice is relevant—these isolated examples
imply that an official practice can be constitutionally significant even when
it involves the independent, uncoordinated actions of plural sovereigns (i.e.,
different states) at distinct moments in historical time. In Evenwel, for
example, the use of a voter population metric for redistricting extended
across every state in the nation and downward to many substate
jurisdictions. 40 The Court, moreover, did not ask for evidence that all these
jurisdictions were acting in concert or speaking from the same hymnal. The
independent, uncoordinated quality of a state practice posed no obstacle to
judicial reliance on gloss. This should be enough to rebut the notion that
official practice counts only when the number of actors involved is small (as
in the separation of powers context but not the Fourth Amendment domain).
Notwithstanding its diffusion across diverse domains of constitutional
law, the idea of gloss remains imprecise along several margins. First, it is not
clear how the relevant institutional practice is defined. 41 An official practice
can often be defined at different levels of generality. The more general and
abstract the description, the wider the shadow cast by a historical practice on
contemporary constitutional meaning. Second, although it is clear that gloss
need not be anchored in the early Republic, it is not clear how long a practice
must endure before it ripens into significance for constitutional
interpretation. How many instances of a discrete action, for instance, must
be observed before the terms gloss or practice are warranted? The case law
yields no answer. Third, in the separation of powers context, there is a
question of what exactly constitutes acquiescence by the coordinate branches
sufficient to induce a practice’s ratification. 42 The definition of acquiescence
might be thought to vary across different branches of government. Congress,
for example, might face transaction costs in overcoming its collective action
problems that do not hinder the Executive Branch. 43 Acquiescence by the
39 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992) (plurality opinion); see also Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (observing that an “unbroken practice” followed “openly and by
affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside”).
40 136 S. Ct. at 1132.
41 Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 77 (2013)
(exploring this unit-of-analysis question in a response to Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor
Morrison).
42 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24, at 440–44 (discussing difficulties that Congress has in
manifesting an absence of acquiescence).
43 Id. at 448 (noting that “it is precarious to infer congressional acquiescence” from “the absence
of legislation prohibiting the executive action in question”). In contrast, a recent study of
nonexecutive foreign relations matters has also underscored the gap between Congress’s and the
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latter might therefore be calibrated in less demanding terms in light of the
lower risk that inaction or ambiguous action will be mistaken for
endorsement.
Finally, assuming the relevant practice and responsive acquiescence are
defined with sufficient clarity, we must also decide what weight a federal
court will assign to gloss in the process of resolving a constitutional question.
A court might treat evidence of historical gloss merely as evidence of
historical actors’ understanding of the Constitution, as in the commandeering
cases. 44 In other instances, gloss supplies a complete and dispositive answer
to a question left open by constitutional text. 45 Rather more subtly, in yet
other cases “historical practice can affect perceptions about the clarity or
ambiguity of the text.” 46 How to characterize gloss’s relationship to other
sources of constitutional meaning, moreover, remains an open question.
Probably the most that can be said for now is that courts weigh various
sources of constitutional meaning implicitly and imprecisely. This may not
be a bad thing. Perhaps it is possible to create a more precise algorithm for
deciding how to weigh text, original meaning, precedent, purpose, and gloss.
But it is far from clear that routinizing constitutional interpretation in this
fashion would have a desirable effect on the ineffable and very human art of
judging. 47
B. Justifications for the Use of Gloss as a Source of
Constitutional Meaning
Jurists and scholars alike have become so inured to invocations of gloss
in constitutional argument that they have ceased to notice how peculiar they
are. Reliance on official practice to resolve a constitutional dispute might
first be taken to imply that there is no evidence contemporaneous to the
Executive’s capacity to respond to another branch’s practice-based assertions of constitutional
authority. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 U.
CHI. L. REV. 609, 615 (2018) (positing that “[t]he comparative ease with which the president can
respond to actions by the nonexecutive branches suggests that silence by the executive is a more
meaningful signal of approval or acquiescence than silence by Congress”).
44 See supra note 34.
45 For an instance in which gloss has played a seemingly conclusive role, see Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981), in which the Court relied upon gloss as a source of authority for
a presidential action in the absence of explicit statutory authority.
46 Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and
Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 41–42; accord Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty
Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 784 (2014) (noting that gloss has been an
important tool in allowing the Court to find and interpret ambiguity in constitutional text).
47 For a landmark effort to show that “constitutional interpretation is, after all, less free-form an
exercise” than some suppose, see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1227
(1995).
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Constitution’s enactment that resolves the dispute. Indeed, Justice
Frankfurter sliced cleanly between “the words of the Constitution” and “the
gloss which life has written upon them” as two distinct sources of law. 48
Historical gloss, moreover, looks at the actions of elected and appointed
actors, often pursuing local and idiosyncratic policy agendas, as a source of
new meaning of the Constitution that empowers those subsequent iterations
of those officials. Gloss thus can have an inherent circularity, at least when
federal power is at stake. 49 And when a court relies on gloss to reach a final
judgment, it transmutes political actors’ inchoate, perhaps contested and
contestable, perhaps even inarticulate situational sense into a hard, definite
rule of constitutional law. 50 This has consequences. Very concretely,
violations of a judicially ratified gloss can precipitate damages and injunctive
relief; gloss in the absence of judicial endorsement cannot. 51
Judicial reliance on officials’ practice, therefore, requires justification.
Yet the Justices have not tried to explain why or when historical gloss should
patch gaps in constitutional meaning (although they have offered a reason
for using inaction as circumstantial evidence of shared constitutional
understanding when evaluating the absence of a historical practice 52). Into

48 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
49 To the extent that Fourth Amendment gloss is a product of local and state police action, it is
not amenable to this circularity critique. Yet to date, gloss in the criminal procedure domain has
tended to prioritize the judgments of federal over state actors. Cf. infra text accompanying note 131.
50 One way to think about gloss in the absence of judicial ratification is as a form of
constitutional “convention.” Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional
Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1854–55 (introducing this idea into
U.S. constitutional discourse). Hence, Professors Curtis Bradley and Niel Siegel suggest that there
is an analytic distinction between “practice-based norms that have legal status (in which case they
constitute historical gloss) and those that do not (in which case they constitute constitutional
conventions), regardless of whether they are subject to judicial review.” Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S.
Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers,
105 GEO. L.J. 255, 267 (2017). I am not convinced, however, that in judicial consideration of gloss
courts draw a crisp and clear distinction between patterns of official behavior based on the presence
or absence of “legal status” (however that is defined). Professors Bradley and Siegel may thus offer
a degree of analytic precision above and beyond what the judiciary’s observed practice would
support. Where the relevant practice is shared among a highly decentralized and dispersed set of
actors—as in the Fourth Amendment context—it becomes even harder to distinguish between the
presence and absence of “legal status.” As a result, the distinction that Bradley and Siegel draw
becomes even harder to sustain.
51 For a similar intuition, see Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the
Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 69, 75 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (noting that “for
some customary rules, there is no readily available hook, and as a consequence, political actors may
be tempted to violate them” when they would not have violated a constitutional rule).
52 See infra Section II.A.2.
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this gap, scholars have leapt. 53 I thus draw on both case law and secondary
sources to develop a set of justifications for courts’ use of gloss. Specifically,
I map out three potential justifications for that practice in the literature: as
acquiescence, Burkean wisdom, and settlement.
First, “courts and other interpreters privilege acquiescence to historical
practice” as reflecting an “agreement” among constitutionally relevant
actors. 54 One example of such bare acquiescence is Dames & Moore v.
Regan, where the majority emphasized that “Congress has accepted the
authority of the Executive to enter into settlement agreements.” 55 The Court
did so without alluding to any functional justifications Congress might have
had for its acceptance. The mere fact of policy dialogue, leading to
convergence, was enough to create gloss.
Acquiescence from nonjudicial actors on the constitutionality of an
action is relevant if one believes that the Court does not have a monopoly on
the power to interpret the Constitution. In the separation of powers context,
this kind of so-called “departmentalist” view of interpretive authority is
common enough among commentators; it also forms a cornerstone of the
political question doctrine. 56 An acquiescence-based view of gloss, as its
name suggests, is not predicated simply on the decision of the branch
engaged in the relevant conduct. It also reflects the response such behavior
elicits from other officials. That response is treated “as a kind of waiver of
the affected branch’s institutional prerogatives.” 57 In the separation of
powers context, the acquiescence justification therefore trades upon the
“negotiated” character of certain constitutional rules. 58 On this view, the
original Constitution is less a manifesto of negative restraint and more a
menu of positive governance options to be employed in response to
contingencies both known and unexpected.
Second, a court might take the view that it owes no deference to other
governmental actors’ constitutional judgments, but that their practical
wisdom, embodied in a series of policy decisions, nonetheless warrants
respect. On this “functional” approach, historical gloss comprises a body of
“accumulated wisdom” to which courts owe deference. 59 This justification
53 The leading piece is Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24 (defining and providing a clear
general roadmap for the analysis of gloss).
54 Id. at 433.
55 453 U.S. 654, 681 (1981).
56 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24, at 434 & n.89 (collecting leading departmentalist texts).
57 Id. at 435.
58 For a defense of this idea of “negotiated” constitutional positions, see Aziz Z. Huq, The
Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1607–10 (2014) (defining and giving
examples of interbranch bargaining).
59 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24, at 427–28, 435.
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sounds in a Burkean register inasmuch as it looks to what the English
politician and political thinker Edmund Burke called “the collected reason
of ages” as more likely to be correct than first-order reasoning by
contemporary actors seeking to innovate against the grain of received
wisdom. 60
Notice that the Burkean justification rests on a sort of intellectual parlor
trick that, in other contexts, has discomforted the Justices. A policy judgment
on the part of nonjudicial actors is metamorphosed into a rule of
constitutional law that cannot be derogated by statute or qualified by official
discretion. Practical wisdom (or its shadow), that is, is transmuted into law.
In a different context, several members of the Court have expressed
discomfort about decades-old doctrines of judicial deference to
administrative agencies’ expert judgments on the meaning of ambiguous
statutes. 61 One Justice has gone so far as to suggest that such deference
violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. 62 The core concern
propelling these critiques, as articulated by then-Judge Neil Gorsuch, speaks
in terms of “concentrate[d] federal power” and “the abdication of the judicial
duty.” 63 Just this last Term, Justice Kennedy directed concern at a
government actor’s power to define the scope of her own discretionary
authority. 64 These worries are worth keeping in mind when one turns to the
Fourth Amendment.
A rough analogy exists between judicial deference to other officials’
expertise-backed judgments about the Constitution (at issue in gloss) and to
their expertise-backed judgments about the meaning of federal statutes (at
issue in the administrative debate). But the Justices have not noticed this
analogy. There is also a gap in the judicial treatment of these similar species
60 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790), reprinted in THE
PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 416, 456–57 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999). Although the Court has not
described gloss in Burkean terms, in the leading scholarly piece on Burkean jurisprudence, Professor
Cass Sunstein characterizes the Steel Seizure decision as a leading example of the genre. Cass R.
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 & n.11 (2006).
61 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1211–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Decker v. Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615–16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (Justice Alito joining); id.
at 616–21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“These cases bring
into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to
countenance in the name of Chevron deference.”).
63 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149, 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
64 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding especially “troubling” the
“reflexive deference exhibited” to “an agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions that
concern the scope of its own authority”).
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of expertise-backed judgment. I flag this gap here because it opens up a
productive line of inquiry in respect to Fourth Amendment gloss: Should
nonjudicial actors’ expertise-backed views of the prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures receive the same deference as judgments
on the separation of power, or is it more akin to judgments about statutes?
And should the concerns about concentrated power bear upon the scope of
Fourth Amendment gloss? Analogies across doctrinal boundaries make
either a positive or a negative answer possible.
A third way that historical gloss may be justified is in terms of
settlement rather than wisdom. Where a practice has emerged as a stable
equilibrium solution to constitutional ambiguity, the very fact of its stability
over time may be sufficient to attract normative freight. Even if it is possible
to imagine a better equilibrium, historical practice may warrant courts’
respect simply because it comports with all relevant actors’ settled
expectations. In consequence, any move to a new equilibrium would
necessarily be costly. When official actors “settle[] upon an institutional
arrangement that they both deem desirable or at least practically workable
and acceptable,” the bare fact of functionality may suffice to trigger judicial
respect. 65
Justice Frankfurter offered an earlier example of gloss as settlement in
his Steel Seizure concurrence when he discussed United States v. Midwest
Oil Co., 66 a case concerning presidential withdrawals of public land from the
real estate market. 67 The Midwest Oil Court, explained Justice Frankfurter,
had authorized a practice that extended “over a period of 80 years and in 252
instances, and by Presidents learned and unlearned in the law.” 68 Justice
Frankfurter here is plainly not leaning on the considered legal judgment of
past chief executives. Rather, the legal force of gloss in Midwest Oil derived
from the sheer persistence in time and frequency of the practice. More
recently, a majority of the Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning endorsed the
President’s use of the recess appointment power to fill vacancies arising
before a Senate recess out of a concern that “upset[ting] this traditional
practice . . . would seriously shrink the authority that Presidents have
believed existed and have exercised for so long.” 69
The settlement justification can be formulated another way by drawing
upon the positive political theory literature on constitutions as focal points.
65

Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24, at 434.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 611 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)).
67 236 U.S. at 461.
68 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 611 (emphasis added).
69 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2573 (2014).
66
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Economists have observed that in situations with multiple potential
equilibrium solutions, “players [can] still ‘know’ what to do” based on
“knowledge . . . from both directly relevant past experience and a sense of
how individuals act generally.” 70 That is, they have an exogenously supplied
“focal point.” The theory of focal points is relevant here because one
important function of written constitutions is to provide a “crisp focal point”
for citizens concerned specifically about government overreaching or
illegality. 71 Like a proverbial red line, the focal point supplies “diffuse social
and political actors with a coordinating signal that [constitutional] norms are
imperiled.” 72 A focal point account helps explain why it makes sense for
courts to transform inchoate and atextual understandings shared by political
actors into hard-edged, textually precise legal rules. Such a transformation
leverages the “expressive power a third party wields when he declares to
disputants how they should resolve their dispute.” 73 The court, acting as that
third party, reduces uncertainty and elicits legal compliance and
predictability by reducing what had previously been an understanding “in the
air” to one that can easily be consulted and verified—i.e., a focal point. This
interpretation of the settlement justification looks at the manner in which a
rule can facilitate coordination among citizens. It is in this regard that it is
subtly distinct from the version of the settlement justification that looks at
whether a practice has become settled among officials.
The settlement justification (in either of its two flavors) is subtly
different from its acquiescence and Burkean confreres. It is less dependent
on the fact of officials’ agreement and so less sensitive to the prospect of
protest, explicit or implicit, against an official position on the scope of legal
powers. Further, whereas the argument from Burkean wisdom would seem
to demand some durable pattern of behavior to draw an inference of wisdom
accrued, the argument for settlement might be predicated on a briefer span
of conduct. Something can serve as a focal point, that is, even if it has not
been implemented iteratively over a long time. The settlement justification,
therefore, may be the least profound and the most instrumental of all three
theoretical grounds for gloss.

70 DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 101 (1990). The seminal discussion
of focal points is THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–58 (1960).
71 Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose A Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78,
119 (2018); see also Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of
Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 246 (1997) (developing a formal model of focal points).
72 Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 71, at 110.
73 Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043,
1048.
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II. THE VARIETIES OF FOURTH AMENDMENT GLOSS
I turn now from the justifications for gloss to the ways in which gloss
is employed in the Fourth Amendment context. There are three categories of
usage that describe how gloss is used in search and seizure law: gloss as
substantive content, gloss as benchmark, and gloss as substitute. (A
caution—these categories do not map neatly onto the three justifications for
gloss described in Part I. Uses and justifications are subtly different matters.)
Fourth Amendment gloss emerges at distinct points of an elaborate
jurisprudential terrain. Thus, to understand the role of gloss, it is useful to
begin by mapping the terrain in which its use arises and identifying what
kind of Fourth Amendment questions it illuminates. Fourth Amendment
analysis has three steps. 74 First, a court must determine whether a particular
state action is a “search” or “seizure.” 75
Second, assuming that the state action is a search or seizure such that
the Fourth Amendment is even triggered, then there is a question of what
follows procedurally from that determination. At this stage, the court must
determine what quantum of suspicion the state must demonstrate to justify
its intrusion. This step hinges on the Fourth Amendment’s text, which
consists of two grammatically disjunctive clauses: the first talks of
“warrants” and the second disavows “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
Recently, the Court has embraced an open-textured reasonableness standard,
the demands of which depend on the severity of the intrusion. 76 Thus in
practice, courts can impose a range of different procedural rules on different
types of intrusions, from a warrant based on probable cause for the most
intrusive to no justification at all for the least. This range is illustrated in
microcosm by the Court’s treatment of searches incident to arrest. For most
objects, a lawful arrest triggers authority to search without any warrant or
quantum of suspicion. 77 But for the data contained within cell phones, it
displaces neither the warrant nor the probable cause requirement. 78
74 Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 610 (2016) (“The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures can
be divided into three questions . . . .”).
75 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (considering whether
acquisition of cell-site locational data from a third-party data provider constitutes a “search”).
76 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994)
(noting that a judge must consider the “Amendment’s words and take them seriously: they do not
require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion of evidence, but they do require that all searches and
seizures be reasonable”).
77 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (“[A] search incident to a lawful arrest
is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).
78 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (“Our answer to the question of what police
must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a
warrant.”).
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Finally, if a court has found that an official has executed an
unreasonable search or seizure, it must determine whether a remedy, in the
form of damages in the civil context or exclusion of the evidence obtained
in the criminal context, is warranted. In both contexts, the Court has
fashioned screening rules that preclude remediation absent a showing of
“fault” on the part of the state official. 79 In the damages context, this is a
function of qualified immunity. 80 In the suppression context, it follows from
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 81
Where in this complex structure does the Court inject official practice
as a source of law? Gloss is generally not invoked to ascertain what counts
as a search or seizure. The most common invocation of gloss instead occurs
at the second stage, when a court considers what kind of process officials
must follow to justify an intrusion. As noted above, the Court has repeatedly
framed this inquiry in terms of “reasonableness.” 82 At one point, the Justices
equated reasonableness with a presumptive warrant requirement. 83
Subsequently, the Court stated that “reasonableness” would be glossed in
terms of the common law circa 1791. 84 But this “originalist” analysis—
which I shall explore in more detail momentarily—proved insufficient, 85
leaving room for an inquiry into gloss. 86 The final use of “gloss as substitute”

79 Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1547–50 (2018);
see also Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on
Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 237–39 (discussing
convergence in these two lines of Fourth Amendment remedies).
80 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967).
81 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924–25 (1984); id. at 906 (defining the exclusionary rule
as “precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of [the Fourth Amendment’s] commands”).
82 See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (“[R]easonableness
is always the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis . . . .” (quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota,
136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016))); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ . . . .”).
83 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 559
(1999) (“For most of [the twentieth] century, the Supreme Court has endorsed what is now called
the ‘warrant-preference’ construction of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in which the use of a
valid warrant . . . is the salient factor in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”).
84 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation
of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2011))); see also
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (“In determining whether a particular
governmental action violates [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the action was
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed.”).
85 See Sklansky, supra note 20, at 1762–70 (developing powerful criticisms of the originalist
approach).
86 On the wide and varied use of the term “reasonableness” across heterogeneous fields of law,
see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness in and out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2131,
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occurs in the third, remedial step of the Fourth Amendment inquiry, where
it supplies a reason to deny remedies.
It is worth pausing here to clarify the distinction between Fourth
Amendment gloss and the Court’s use of eighteenth-century common law.
These appeals to authority are distinct, although both partially look at official
behavior. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court began invoking with increasing
frequency the notion that “the common law when the Amendment was
framed” was a reference point for reasonableness. 87 For instance, the Court
looked to common law trespass to determine whether the placement of a GPS
device on the chassis of a vehicle was a “search.”88 Building on this
precedent, Justice Clarence Thomas recently invoked the “common law” as
a basis for condemning the exclusionary rule. 89 These arguments are
methodologically distinct from gloss arguments. Rather than looking to what
state officials do, they focus on the content of the law. No question of
acquiescence or the duration of behavior arises. Moreover, rather than
ranging across time, these common law cases train resolutely on the 1790s.90
Finally, common law originalism remains at best an occasional touchstone
in Fourth Amendment cases. The recent Carpenter decision, holding that
acquisition of cell-site locational data from telephone providers constituted
a search, did not even attempt to find analogies in eighteenth-century tort or
contract law. 91 Gloss, by contrast, is far more pervasive.
With this analytic foundation in place, I now turn to the three ways in
which courts deploy gloss in Fourth Amendment arguments: as substantive
content, as benchmark, and as substitute.
A. Gloss as Substantive Content
Of the three varietals of gloss in the search and seizure context, by far
the most prevalent is the first. Gloss is used quite simply to define the content
2135 (2015) (“The range of uses of ‘reasonableness’ in law is so great that a list is not an efficient
way to describe and demarcate it.”).
87 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299; accord Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999); Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).
88 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
89 Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1677 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that “the
common law sometimes reflected the inverse of the exclusionary rule” as a ground for abandoning
the latter).
90 See Sklansky, supra note 20, at 1743 (describing the common law approach as “reading
eighteenth-century common law into the Fourth Amendment”). The criticisms of the common law
method that Professor Sklansky develops, therefore, do not translate to the Fourth Amendment gloss
context. Id. at 1762–70.
91 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–15 (2018) (describing the question
presented as standing at “the intersection of two lines of cases, both of which inform our
understanding of the privacy interests at stake”).
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of the constitutional rule—or, more accurately, to define one element of the
constitutional regime. That is, rather than measure observed official conduct
against an extrinsic legal benchmark, the Court has endogenized the
constitutional rule—which defines the minimum procedural obligations of
officials regulated by the Fourth Amendment—to what officials do. In a
variant of this approach, it has also looked at the absence of a state practice
as dispositive of the constitutional rule. I consider each of these possibilities
in turn.
1. The Affirmative Use of State Practice
Perhaps the apogee of gloss as substantive content is the Court’s 2001
decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, which authorized an arrest pursuant
to a misdemeanor traffic offense that did not itself allow jail time. 92 Justice
David Souter’s majority opinion invoked a historical narrative that began
with “pre-founding English common law,” including “divers Statutes” from
the 1285 Statute of Winchester onward, to “the historical record as it has
unfolded since the framing.” 93 In the modern era, Justice Souter cited treaties
published between 1884 and 1967 and also appealed to “statutes in all 50
States and the District of Columbia [that] permit warrantless misdemeanor
arrests,” as well as “a host of congressional enactments” that do the same.94
Atwater thus developed a historical gloss argument that transcended
common law arguments, extending both backward and forward in time.
Proof of this extended historical arc served to demonstrate that arrests for
misdemeanors that did not authorize jail time were “reasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment by repudiating the petitioner’s contention that such
arrests had never been allowed. The Court found not only that such arrests
had always been allowed but that this practice proved their reasonableness.
Twenty-five years earlier, the same joint appeal to a common law
history and parallel contemporary practice characterized Justice Byron
White’s majority opinion in United States v. Watson affirming “the ancient
common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest . . . for a
misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not
committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the
arrest.” 95 As in Atwater, the Court in Watson took pains to underscore the
persistence of the common law rule, which remained “substantially intact”
92

532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001). The relevant Texas law at issue in Atwater was a misdemeanor
offense “punishable by a fine not less than $25 or more than $50.” Id. (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 545.413(d) (West 1999)). The same statute, however, also authorized officers to make arrests
for violations. Id. (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.001 (West 1995)).
93 Id. at 327–40.
94 Id. at 343–44.
95 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976).
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until the time of the decision. 96 Justice White cited the American Law
Institute’s proposed (but not enacted at the time) Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure and federal statutes as evidence of “the judgment of
the Nation and Congress . . . to authorize warrantless public arrests on
probable cause.” 97 Watson nicely illustrates the oddness of the gloss
approach. The Court explicitly cited the very existence of the practice
challenged on constitutional grounds as evidence of its constitutionality.
The fraught and complex domain of automobile searches provides a
third illustration of gloss as substantive content. Traffic stops made up 42%
of all police–citizen interactions in 2011 (the last year for which data is
available at the time of this writing), and roughly 26.4 million persons age
sixteen or older indicated that their last contact with police occurred during
a traffic stop. 98 Hence, gloss has far-reaching consequences for many
individuals, since it regulates their modal interactions with police.
In the Court’s first encounter with searches of automobiles, Carroll v.
United States, the Justices relied on gloss to define the procedural requisites
of such searches to render the warrant requirement unnecessary. 99 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice William Howard Taft began by invoking
customs statutes enacted “contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment.” 100 But, as in Atwater and Watson, the Court was at
pains to show that the practice extended into the contemporary period, citing
a 1917 federal statute and an 1899 Alaska statute that allowed for warrantless
vehicular searches to demonstrate that the norm was unbroken “practically
since the beginning of the Government.” 101 Obviously, the references to these
later statutes cannot be explained in terms of common law originalism.
Carroll’s account of continuity contrasted with contemporaneous
federal courts’ conclusion that the Eighteenth Amendment ruptured the
constitutional fabric and so necessitated a rethinking of the Fourth
Amendment’s constraints on vehicular searches. 102 Those courts were also

96

Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 422–23.
98 Traffic
Stops,
BUREAU
JUST.
STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?tid=
702&ty=tp [https://perma.cc/G3BU-BU7Y].
99 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
100 Id. at 150–51 (citing a 1789 statute permitting the search of “any ship or vessel” in relation
to customs violations).
101 Id. at 152–53.
102 See, e.g., United States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231, 234 (S.D. Cal. 1922) (arguing that “the
Eighteenth Amendment would have been stillborn” had warrantless vehicular searches been barred).
This was not the only reason for concern about automobiles. Sarah A. Seo, The New Public,
125 YALE L.J. 1616, 1635 (2016) (documenting judicial anxieties about automobiles’ riskiness to
the general public in the 1920s).
97
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surely cognizant of the dramatic increase in automotive usage in the 1910s.103
At least for Chief Justice Taft, however, Prohibition and the rise of
automobile usage did not change the analysis. In his private correspondence,
Chief Justice Taft stressed a quite different instrumental justification for the
result in Carroll. The automobile, he noted, was “the greatest instrument for
promoting immunity of crimes of violence that I know of in the history of
civilization.” 104 The Court’s subsequent decisions endorsed and enlarged the
Carroll rule to encompass containers found in a vehicle. They again stressed
the historical continuity of vehicle-related searches and the absence of
legitimate reliance interests on the part of drivers.105 The amalgam of
eighteenth-century common law and post-ratification gloss thus proved a
durable foundation for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Finally, a variant on gloss as substantive content is the possibility of
looking to legislative action as a source of Fourth Amendment meaning. In
two recent cases concerning new technologies of locational tracking and cell
phone data, Justice Alito suggested that the Court should attend—and even
pay heightened deference—to legislative judgments on the Fourth
103 Between 1910 and 1924, the number of registered passenger automobiles in the United States
increased from 500,000 to 15,500,000. ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A
STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE 253 n.3 (1929).
104 Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative
State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 125 n.408 (2006). Historian
Sarah Seo argues that a shift did occur in suspects’ ability to evade arrest as a consequence of
automobiles’ mass availability. Before 1913, when mass production of vehicles took off, “[i]f a law
officer had reason to believe that a suspect was skipping town or fleeing with a cargo of illegal or
stolen goods, he usually had ample time to obtain a warrant for search and arrest”—an impossibility
once flight by automobile became available. Sarah A. Seo, Antinomies and the Automobile: A New
Approach to Criminal Justice Histories, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1020, 1031 (2013).
105 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (finding “no legitimate reliance interest”
and noting that “the rule we apply in this case is faithful to the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment that the Court has followed with substantial consistency throughout our history”); id. at
820 n.26 (“During virtually the entire history of our country—whether contraband was transported
in a horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern automobile—it has been assumed that a
lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that might conceal the object of
the search.”); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (noting the same rationale). In
another line of cases, the Court has relied on the sheer frequency of police contact with automobiles
as a justification for permitting warrantless searches. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441
(1973) (“As a result of our federal system of government, however, state and local police officers,
unlike federal officers, have much more contact with vehicles for reasons related to the operation of
vehicles themselves.”). While largely a decision based on the eighteenth-century common law,
Wyoming v. Houghton contains a brief reference to post-ratification “practice under [customs]
statutes.” 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999). I do not think this is enough to rank it as a gloss case. The
Court’s most recent decision on the automobile exception does not dwell on historical continuity.
See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669 (2018) (identifying two policy justifications for
warrantless automobile searches). Since those two justifications were found not to apply to the facts
of the case, whereas the historical basis for the rule would have applied, it should perhaps be
unsurprising that Collins was the rare automobile case in which the defendant prevailed.
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Amendment’s implementation. 106 There is no logical reason this analytic
frame should be limited to new enactments. If legislation has already created
a basis for stable practice, Justice Alito’s reasoning would suggest deference.
There are, however, few federal enactments regulating searches and seizures
outside the context of electronic communications 107 and national security. 108
The former, however, is a response to a Supreme Court decision (albeit one
that supplements its response with a good deal more regulatory detail), 109
while the latter is rarely subject to challenge. Nevertheless, Justice Alito’s
suggestions are a useful reminder that a gloss argument need not be cabined
to executive officials. It can also encompass legislative actors.
Across all these cases, the Court treated the Fourth Amendment’s
procedural element as endogenous to—indeed, as derivative of—the current
and historical practice of police. It leaned heavily on gloss, particularly in
practically significant cases, such as those involving vehicular stops and
misdemeanor arrests. Indeed, in the absence of gloss as substantive content,
it seems plausible to think that Fourth Amendment law on the ground today
would look very different.
2. The Absence of Gloss as the Absence of Constitutional Authority
In the jurisprudence of structural constitutionalism, the absence of
historical precedent can serve as a predicate for finding that an official
practice falls outside constitutional bounds. The starkest example of this
reasoning, as noted, occurs in the federalism jurisprudence of anti106

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“I would reconsider
the question presented here if either Congress or state legislatures, after assessing the legitimate
needs of law enforcement and the privacy interests of cell phone owners, enact legislation that draws
reasonable distinctions based on categories of information or perhaps other variables.”); United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances involving
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”). Justice
Alito cited an important article by Professor Orin Kerr on institutional competence and technological
change in the Fourth Amendment domain. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004)
[hereinafter Kerr, Constitutional Myths] (“[C]ourts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of
judicial caution when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide the
primary rules governing law enforcement investigations involving new technologies.”). Professor
Kerr himself has subsequently taken a different tack. Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on
Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2017) (“Structural differences
between the Fourth Amendment and investigative legislation make legislation a poor signal of
constitutionally relevant judgments.”).
107 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012) (governing electronic surveillance during ordinary
criminal investigations).
108 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 105(a)(2)(A), 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012) (regarding the “electronic surveillance [of] a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power”).
109 Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 106, at 847–51 (describing the legislative history of
the Wiretapping Act).
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commandeering. 110 A similar analytic move is found in Fourth Amendment
cases, where the absence of a practice is taken as evidence that the practice
is not constitutional.
The absence of gloss was central in the Court’s very first landmark
Fourth Amendment decision, the 1886 judgment in Boyd v. United States. 111
Boyd arose out of a seizure of goods alleged to have been imported without
payment of duties. 112 Exercising an authority first granted by a June 1874
federal statute, the U.S. Attorney had demanded that the importer (Boyd)
produce certain invoices at peril of having the facts at issue in the case found
against him. 113 The Court held that this “compulsory production of a man’s
private papers . . . to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.” 114 As in other “gloss as substantive content” cases, the Boyd
Court relied on both “[t]he views of the first Congress” 115 and subsequent
practice—or rather the lack thereof. Specifically, the Boyd Court observed
that the statutory authority at issue “was the first legislation of the kind that
ever appeared on the statute book of the United States, . . . as seen from its
date.” 116 The Court further stressed the “total unlikeness” of the 1874
provisions to any earlier customs-related legislation. 117 In these passages,
Boyd can be fairly read to say that the shape of governmental practice in the
past determines the boundaries of present legal authority: Absence begets
absence, just as usage begets authority. Boyd’s logic is therefore the inverse
of precedent such as Atwater, Watson, and Carroll.
More recently, the absence of analogous historical practice has played
a role in decisions concerning the interaction of new technologies with the
Fourth Amendment. Recall that in United States v. Jones, a unanimous Court
held that the placement of a GPS device on the undercarriage of a suspect’s
vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 118 (Jones, I note,
is the rare case in which gloss played a role in defining the threshold scope
of the Fourth Amendment’s operation.) The majority opinion by Justice
Scalia noted, and the concurring opinion of Justice Alito underscored, the
110 See supra text accompanying notes 33–35; see also, e.g., New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992).
111 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
112 Id. at 617–18.
113 Id. at 619–20.
114 Id. at 622, 630. The Court also noted that the Fifth Amendment applied. Id. at 630.
115 Id. at 630.
116 Id. at 621. The Court further observed that this was a moment “of great national excitement,
when the powers of the government were subjected to a severe strain to protect the national
existence.” Id.
117 Id. at 624.
118 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).
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disanalogy between the kinds of surveillance available to the police during
earlier periods of American history and GPS vehicular tracking. 119 Two years
later, in Riley v. California, the Court held that a warrant was required to
search a cell phone’s contents even when police had acquired it pursuant to
a search incident to arrest. 120 Again, the Court underscored the disjunction
between the kind of evidence that might have been found on a suspect’s
person in the past and the data accessible via a cell phone.121 Equating the
two was “like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from
a flight to the moon.” 122 In both Jones and Riley, the Court thus pointed to
the absence of any analogous historical practice as a reason for tougher
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
But technological leaps do not always defeat arguments from gloss. In
Maryland v. King, the Court held that taking a buccal swab for DNA during
an arrest and using that DNA to match the suspect to evidence from older
“cold” cases was reasonable. 123 The Court drew an analogy between DNA
identification and the practice of fingerprinting all suspects that developed
in “the middle of the 20th century.” 124 It reasoned that because DNA
identification was merely “an advanced technique superior to fingerprinting
in many ways,” it “would make little sense to either the forensic expert or a
layperson” to distinguish them for Fourth Amendment purposes. 125 The
practical continuity between different means of suspect identification, the
Court reasoned, vouchsafed the legality of DNA testing despite
technological change. 126
Uniting the lines of cases described in the last two Sections is the
Court’s attention to durable historical practice as a touchstone for
determining which police practices count as “reasonable.” History can play
119 Id. at 406 n.3 (discussing the analogy between a constable concealing himself in a coach in
the eighteenth century and twenty-first-century GPS tracking); id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment) (same).
120 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
121 Id. at 2488–89 (“Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those
implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”).
122 Id. at 2488.
123 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013) (affirming reasonableness as the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment).
124 Id. at 459.
125 Id. Underscoring the importance of continuity over time, the Court further rejected the
defendant’s argument that DNA identification took far longer than fingerprinting by looking forward
in time to new technologies that would expedite genetic testing. Id. at 460.
126 The analogy is problematic, however, insofar as few attempts have been made to empirically
confirm the predicate assumption of individual uniqueness that animates fingerprinting or to
examine error rates. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 894 (2005). That is, the historical practice on which the
King Court hung its hat may be problematically error-prone.
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both a positive and a negative role for the Court: it can authorize as much as
it can undermine the state’s claim to power. It makes sense, therefore, to treat
these two lines of cases under the same analytic rubric because history is
playing the same function in both, albeit with different valences.
B. Gloss as Benchmark
A further, distinct judicial use of state practice is as a benchmarking
source of “best practices.” By examining variation in the policing and
prosecutorial practices of different jurisdictions, the Court can draw
inferences about whether a challenged state action is necessary to achieve
public order and safety. The distinctive trait of gloss as benchmark is
interjurisdictional comparison. Gloss as benchmark does not have an easy
parallel in other domains of constitutional law, but it does resemble the
practice of “norming” in administrative law. According to Professors
Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner, an agency engaged in norming picks “a
level of strictness that puts significant burdens on industry outliers—the
firms with the worst practices—while putting limited burdens or none at all
to the firms whose practices are of average quality or better”; as a result, the
“actual practices of industries” provide a measure of “the regulatory
standard.” 127
Perhaps the most practically important use of gloss as benchmark arose
in a case about remedies rather than the meaning of “reasonableness”—the
1961 landmark decision in Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the exclusionary
rule to the states. 128 An exclusionary rule remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations had been obtained in federal court since 1914, 129 but when the
Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states in 1949, it
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to state criminal trials.130 Mapp,
therefore, did not need to explain why the exclusionary rule was warranted.
Rather, the Court faced the problem of explaining why the factual landscape
had changed since 1949 so as to legitimate the expansion of the Fourth
Amendment to state courts.
Pivotal to the majority’s explanation was a benchmarking argument
drawing on federal practice. Citing a speech by none other than FBI Director
J. Edgar Hoover, the Mapp Court pointedly observed that “it has not been
suggested either that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has . . . been
127 Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Norming in Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3132881 [https://perma.cc/S38N-7G8D].
128 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
129 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
130 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1949).
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rendered ineffective” by the imposition of the exclusionary rule in federal
prosecutions. 131 Moreover, the Court pointed to its abrogation of the “silver
platter” doctrine, which had allowed federal officials to share unlawfully
secured information with state counterparts for introduction into a state
tribunal. 132 Again, the Court suggested that expanding the exclusionary rule
in this fashion had not compromised law enforcement. Ordinary policing, the
Court implied, not only could coexist happily with the exclusionary rule but
already did so without sacrificing public safety to any palpable degree.
A second use of gloss as benchmarking is found in the Court’s
consideration of deadly police force as a form of “seizure.” In Tennessee v.
Garner, the Court held that “[deadly] force may not be used unless it is
necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury
to the officer or others.” 133 Garner framed the question of whether deadly
force could be employed in terms of “balancing” the suspect’s interest in
staying alive against the state’s interest in public order and safety. 134 To
evaluate the state’s interests, Justice White’s majority opinion recognized the
“fact . . . that a majority of police departments in this country have forbidden
the use of deadly force against nonviolent suspects.” 135
Garner is notable for the level of detail with which the Court conducted
this inquiry. The Court reviewed policies adopted by both states and the
federal government, it considered requirements for accreditation by the
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, and it
discussed an empirical study by the International Association of Chiefs of
Police. 136 It further cited an amicus brief joined by the Police Foundation,
nine national and international associations of police and criminal justice
professionals, the chiefs of police associations of two states, and thirty-one
law enforcement chief executives—all of whom attested to deadly force’s
inefficacy in practice. 137 This corpus of evidence about actual practice
permitted the Court to reason that “[i]f those charged with the enforcement
of the criminal law have abjured the use of deadly force in arresting
131 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (footnote omitted) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
218 (1960)).
132 Id. at 653.
133 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
134 Id. at 7–8 (explaining that the Court, by “balancing the extent of the intrusion against the
need for it, has examined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is
conducted”).
135 Id. at 10–11.
136 Id. at 18.
137 Id. at 19; see also Brief for the Police Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Respondent-Appellee at 27–40, Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (Nos. 83-1035, 83-1070), 1984 WL 566025.
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nondangerous felons, there is a substantial basis for doubting that the use of
such force is an essential attribute of the arrest power in all felony cases.” 138
In effect, the Court surveyed the field of policing practices and determined
that Tennessee was an outlier whose practices warranted no respect.139
A third, more recent example of gloss as benchmark can be found in the
recent decision excluding cell-phone contents from the scope of warrantless
searches incident to arrest. 140 In Riley v. California, the Court sought to
respond to the concern that an arrestee’s cell phone might pose a risk to
officer safety because it could be used to alert compatriots in crime. 141 As in
Garner, the Court again engaged in a comparative analysis of policing
practices. It discerned “a number of law enforcement agencies around the
country [that] already encourage the use of Faraday bags,” aluminum bags
(akin to sandwich wrapping) that can simply and quickly be used to isolate
a phone. 142 The Riley Court could have made this point without
benchmarking, yet it felt compelled to go beyond its bare intuition to make
a comparative argument—which itself is a telling sign of the importance of
gloss in the Fourth Amendment context.
Finally, gloss as benchmark can be fleetingly glimpsed in the related
jurisprudence of street stops. The landmark Terry v. Ohio opinion—holding
that investigative stops are permitted on a showing of reasonable articulable
suspicion—turned largely on the pragmatic need for such stops. 143 Chief
Justice Earl Warren, however, noted that street stops were a kind of “swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat—which historically has not been . . . subjected to the warrant
procedure.” 144 This suggests at least awareness of historical practice.
More interestingly, the Court’s resolution of the case—splitting the
victory by allowing investigative stops without probable cause while still
requiring the lower reasonable articulable suspicion standard—was
anticipated by an amicus brief submitted by the National District Attorneys
138

Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
Garner, though, is an outlier in its comparative method in this area of Fourth Amendment
law. Subsequent decisions offered more inchoate and ambiguous formulations of the relevant legal
rule, such that in general police are not “on notice of whether a particular use of force is
constitutional.” Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119,
1143 (2008) (developing an extensive critique of the doctrine’s underspecification).
140 The leading case for the doctrine more generally is Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–
63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape.”).
141 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
142 Id. at 2487.
143 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
144 Id. at 20.
139
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Association (NDAA). 145 The NDAA recommended the Court follow
California’s recently adopted rule, which turned upon whether “a reasonable
man” would believe, based on the “circumstances,” that a stop was
“‘necessary to proper discharge’ of an officer’s duties.” 146 Because Chief
Justice Warren did not cite the NDAA brief, it is impossible to be certain that
Terry in fact relied on this benchmark. But its presence in the briefing is
evidence that the Court could have inferred the absence of a compelling
need for police power to make stops without any level of suspicion by
reference to California’s practice. 147
As I have described it, gloss as benchmarking is a varied phenomenon.
On the one hand, Mapp and Garner invalidate practices in what Professor
Justin Driver calls “holdout” jurisdictions. 148 The states chastised by those
decisions were laggards in relation to an otherwise uniform trend of
increasing professionalization and sophistication in police practices. 149 In
contrast, Riley and Terry rest on comparisons between jurisdictions but do
not suggest that the favored states are a majority or follow a dominant
practice. The logic of Riley and Terry is not the logic of holdouts but is rather
more akin to a search for what environmental law calls the “best available
technology.” 150 In short, gloss as benchmarking can have both a diachronic
(development) and a synchronic form, depending on the set of comparators
used.
C. Gloss as Substitute
Finally, gloss might be employed as a substitute for constitutional
protection. More specifically, the Court’s belief that officials generally
engage in certain rights-protecting practices can support the conclusion that
the imposition of consequences for a Fourth Amendment violation—
typically, the suppression of inculpatory evidence—is unjustified. This is an
argument offered at the third and, also, final stage of Fourth Amendment
145

RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE
MAKING OF THE 1960S, at 206 (Oxford Univ. Press 2016).
146 Id. (citing Brief of National District Attorneys Association, Amicus Curiae, in Support of
Respondent at 35, Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (No. 67), 1967 WL 113688).
147 For a similar argument of practicality from observed policing practices, see, for example,
Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 873–74 (2014), discussing the practicality
of administering warnings during automobile stops by drawing on training manuals and state
practice.
148 Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 937 (2014) (“An outlier that is
a holdout involves a state law or practice that, although perhaps once prevalent, has now receded
and exists in, at most, a few remaining jurisdictions.” (emphasis omitted)).
149 Id. at 952 (describing the elimination of holdouts as “extinguishing practices that time has
left behind”).
150 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
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analysis, where the question is whether exclusion is warranted. But the
elimination of the exclusionary rule means there is no meaningful way to
enforce the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. For where there
is no exclusionary remedy, but where state law still requires a warrant,
empirical studies suggest that police “pretty much completely ignored the
warrant requirement.” 151 Gloss as substitute, in short, has powerful practical
repercussions for legal compliance.
This deployment of gloss arises in case law extending and amplifying
the Court’s 1984 decision in United States v. Leon, which had fashioned a
“good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule for “searches conducted
pursuant to warrants.” 152 Leon’s exception initially applied only to searches
based on warrants that were erroneously issued by a magistrate, unless it was
“‘entirely unreasonable’ for an officer to believe, in the particular
circumstances of this case, that there was probable cause.” 153 But Leon has
subsequently been extended piecemeal to cover a far larger fraction of
unlawful searches. 154 It is here that gloss has played a major role.
Two extrusions of Leon rely on gloss as substitute. First, in Hudson v.
Michigan, the Court considered and rejected exclusion as a remedy for
violations of the “knock and announce” rule, which requires officers to
knock before entering a home to execute a warrant.155 Explaining this
remedial rationing, Justice Scalia pointed to what he called “the increasing
professionalism of police forces” and to a “new emphasis on internal police
discipline” as a result of “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training,
and supervision of police officers.” 156 Given these changes in policing,
Justice Scalia reasoned, “modern police forces are staffed with professionals;
it is not credible to assert that internal discipline, which can limit successful
careers, will not have a deterrent effect.” 157 Unlike Garner, the Hudson Court
did not rely on amicus briefing or empirical evidence of changed practices.
Rather, it cited one historical source and several training manuals as evidence

151 David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 580
(2008) (describing the experience of California, which requires a warrant for a search of garbage,
but which has had no exclusionary rule since a 1982 referendum). For an early recognition of the
remedial vacuum created by the good faith exception to suppression as a remedy, see Donald Dripps,
Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 (1986) (“[T]he Leon majority has withdrawn that remedy
in a class of cases for which no other remedy is available.”).
152 468 U.S. 897, 923–24 (1984).
153 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 549 (2012).
154 See Huq & Lakier, supra note 79, at 1550–51 (describing Leon’s expansion).
155 547 U.S. 586, 590–94 (2006).
156 Id. at 598–99 (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 51 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993)).
157
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of a trend of increasing professionalization. 158 It further assumed—without
either
anecdotal
or
quantitative
evidence—that
increasing
professionalization necessarily translated into lower rates of Fourth
Amendment violations.
The second extension of Leon to rely on gloss as substitute is a touch
more subtle. In Herring v. United States, the Court declined to require
exclusion when a negligent record-keeping error led to a mistaken arrest,
which in turn revealed contraband. 159 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
opinion did not rely on gloss to reach the result that exclusion was “not worth
the cost.” 160 But the conclusion that negligent errors did not warrant
deterrence through exclusion is hardly self-evident. To the contrary, it “flies
squarely in the face of a host of legal frameworks that presume negligence
to be amenable to deterrence—not the least of which is the predominant
theory of tort remedies.” 161
As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg observed in her perceptive dissent, the
best explanation for the Court’s odd assumption that negligence cannot be
deterred through institution-wide policies or safeguards is the majority’s
unstated premise that “police departments have become sufficiently
‘professional’ that they do not need external deterrence to avoid Fourth
Amendment violations.” 162 The practice of professionalism, in short, was
implicitly treated as a “substitute good for the exclusionary rule.” 163 Hence,
although Herring is not a case in which the Court leaned explicitly and
heavily on gloss as substitute, the premise of professional police functioned
as a necessary background assumption for a dialing back of the exclusionary
rule.
Developments in the practice of policing, in short, can obviate as well
as extend the Fourth Amendment’s reach. By no measure is this development
the only means of limiting constitutional protections. Justice Thomas, for
example, has recently invoked formalist and originalist grounds to argue that
the exclusionary rule should be abandoned in state courts 164—a move that
would effectively eliminate the Fourth Amendment as a practical
consideration for most policing. If that were to happen, gloss would no
158

Id. at 598–99.
555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009).
160 Id. at 144 n.4.
161 Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 682–83 (2011) (“The Court’s assignment of a value of near-zero to the
potential of deterring negligent police conduct amounts to an ipse dixit premise.”).
162 Herring, 555 U.S. at 156 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163 Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 422 (2013).
164 Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
159
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longer be the most consequential valve for adjusting the strength of the
Fourth Amendment’s friction on official behavior. Until then, gloss is likely
to be a consequential element of the Fourth Amendment’s remedial
jurisprudence.
D. Summarizing the Role of Gloss in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Judicial invocations of gloss pervade Fourth Amendment doctrine. Yet
gloss has not yet been properly noticed or analyzed as a Fourth Amendment
phenomenon. In my view, there are two reasons for this. First, a great deal
of scholarly energy in the Fourth Amendment domain is concentrated on the
question of what counts as a “search” such that constitutional protection is
triggered. 165 This threshold question attracts scholars because it is complex
and elusive. Fourth Amendment law covers a wide and heterogeneous
landscape of interactions between police and private individuals. The Court
must formulate a rule that addresses chattels, real property, physical
touching, electronic searches, communications acquisition, thermal scans,
metadata acquisition, and more. 166 The threshold rule must be alive to the
broad array of individual interests in play and the many ways in which
government can impinge on those interests. Given the theoretical and
normative complexity of this task, it is no surprise scholars have found it so
alluring.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to think that the definition of search and
seizure exhausts the stock of important Fourth Amendment questions: The
issues of what government action is “reasonable” and of what remedy
attaches to a constitutional violation are in practice just as important. They
are also just as pivotal to whether Fourth Amendment interests are
vindicated. An excessive focus on the question of search—and a relative
inattention to the legal infrastructure that follows—risks missing much that
is of vital practical importance.
Second, because gloss has three different strands and hence can be used
to bolster or alternatively sap the strength of Fourth Amendment protections,
it has no single normative valence. While gloss as content and gloss as
165

See supra note 18.
Another reason that the definition of “search” has received so much attention, in my view, is
that it is the natural berth from which to consider questions of technology—which are of obvious
and immediate interest to many. Yet it is a mistake to think about the interaction of technology and
the Fourth Amendment in isolation. At a very minimum, a natural and perhaps inevitable response
to greater judicial regulation of technologies such as cell-phone data and locational trackers is a more
aggressive approach to searches and seizures of individuals in the real world. Carpenter, for
example, creates an incentive for officials to seek consent to search suspects’ phones and to acquire
historical locational data in at least some cases in which they otherwise would have approached a
telecommunications company (even if this option is by no means always available).
166
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substitute seem to have a generally statist orientation, the absence of gloss
can undermine state power. Gloss as benchmark is also ambiguous. It was
used to constrain state power in Garner but in Terry enabled more invasive
interventions into urban life. 167 As a result of this shifting valence, Justices
of different ideological colors can invoke gloss to their own ends. In contrast,
scholars who argue for either consistently broad or consistently narrow
accounts of the Fourth Amendment cannot simply champion or condemn
gloss. Lacking any simple ideological coding, gloss falls through the cracks.
With that in mind, it has been my aim in this Part to offer a thick
description of the major, if ignored, role that gloss has come to play in this
area of constitutional law. Having installed that account, it is time to consider
whether gloss’s outsized rule in the jurisprudence can be justified.
III. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT GLOSS
It is one thing to say that gloss is ubiquitous. It is another to say that its
use is justified. The Supreme Court has said dismayingly little about the
underlying legal and normative justifications for relying on gloss in the
Fourth Amendment context. This Part therefore asks whether the grounds for
gloss’s relevance that have been identified in the larger constitutional law
literature—as acquiescence, Burkean wisdom, or settlement—provide
normative ballast here. Working through each of the three possible grounds
of justification that were identified in Part I, I suggest that there is only
limited justification for the judicial use of gloss in the Fourth Amendment
context. Indeed, application of constitutional law’s larger theoretical
framework for the evaluation of gloss arguments provides reason to resist
many of the ways in which the Court has come to rely upon official practice
in the Fourth Amendment domain. If gloss’s use persists, therefore, it is
likely not on any principled ground but rather as a function of considerations
not directly tied to the values and goals of the Fourth Amendment itself.
I examine in turn each of the three main justifications for giving weight
to official practice or gloss in constitutional analysis. This assumes that the
reasons for giving weight to gloss in the Fourth Amendment context are a
subset of those the courts have for attributing significance to gloss more
generally across constitutional law. Since the Court has never given bespoke
reasons for Fourth Amendment gloss, this seems a reasonable assumption.
Out of an abundance of caution, though, I have taken a capacious view of

167 Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a
Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2429–40 (2017) (documenting costs of stop,
question, and frisk programs and suggesting that these substantially outweigh the programs’
benefits).
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each justification. This means casting a wide net to consider all possible
grounds for relying upon official practice in the Fourth Amendment context.
A. The Acquiescence Justification
The acquiescence justification for gloss imagines a dialogic process
between multiple institutional actors exercising coordinated constitutional
powers in a context of dynamic and iterative interaction. Treating the
resulting practice as gloss requires the assumption that those actors are
themselves responsible for the constitutional judgments behind different
policies. It also assumes a dialogic process in which the constitutionality of
a practice is recognized, and thus legitimated, by a second actor.
There is simply no good way to fit gloss into this dialogic model in the
Fourth Amendment context. Fourth Amendment law is an interaction
between courts and a highly diffuse and fragmented array of institutions—
police departments, magistrates, and federal investigative entities. State and
local law enforcement agencies alone employed about 1,133,000 persons on
a full-time basis in 2008. 168 Those agencies, moreover, vary greatly in size
and capacity. 169 As a result, police practice is quite different from the fiftystate practice recognized in Evenwel v. Abbott 170—far too diffuse and
heterogeneous to support facile generalizations about trends or consensus.
Hence, the implicit dialogic process of acquiescence at work in the
separation of powers context has no precise analog in the Fourth Amendment
context. Further, there is no colorable argument that the diffuse aggregate of
law enforcement bodies covered by the Fourth Amendment are engaged in
collective or parallel constitutional judgments because they are coordinate
departments that are coequal in authority to the judicial branch. 171 The
acquiescence justification, therefore, is poorly matched to the Fourth
Amendment, whether gloss is being used as substantive content, benchmark,
or substitute.
The heterogeneity of policing raises particularly difficult questions
about the manner in which the Court has enlarged the scope of the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. Recall that, in cases such as Hudson v.
168 BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 1 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCT7-LB9T].
169 About half (49%) of all agencies employed fewer than ten full-time officers. Nearly two-thirds
(64%) of sworn personnel worked for agencies that employed 100 or more officers. Id.
170 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); see supra text accompanying notes 37–38.
171 Can widely used policing manuals be used as evidence of acquiesced-to practice in the
policing context? Cf. Stoughton, supra note 147, at 874–75; Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning
Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1530–37 (2008) (discussing police training manuals’ instructions
on interrogations and suggesting that those instructions influence practice on the ground).
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Michigan 172 and Herring v. United States, 173 the Court predicated this
expansion on a generalization about increasing levels of professionalism
within police departments. But even within a given jurisdiction, it has long
been known that the quality of policing delivered to different neighborhoods
varies dramatically, often along racial or ethnic lines.174 Given
intrajurisdictional disparities in service quality and given the likely
exacerbation of such disparities across departments of different sizes,
different sociopolitical environments, and different criminological
conditions, generalizations about policing are difficult to draw. Hudson’s
assertion that “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and
supervision of police officers” resulted in “the increasing professionalism of
police forces” is hard to substantiate. 175 As I develop further below, the
available empirical evidence suggests we should be very skeptical.176
Worse, the Court’s good faith jurisprudence not only lacks a clear
theoretical account of gloss but also has no stable empirical methodology to
evaluate how to establish the veracity of a general descriptive claim about
policing. Hence, the Court has no way to determine how many police
departments fall at the lower end of the professionalism spectrum or to
ascertain whether these departments are concentrated in impoverished or
racially segregated communities (as is likely the case). 177 Instead, cases such
as Hudson and Herring manifest at best an indifference to the plight of
communities that remain still burdened by suboptimal policing.
Despite these limits to the application of the acquiescence justification
here, there is a dialogic process of interbranch deliberation at work in Fourth
Amendment law. But it is not one that supports an inference of gloss in any
of the forms observed in the current case law—and it is one that undermines
any further doctrinal accounting for other actors’ acquiescence. The Fourth
172

547 U.S. 586 (2006).
555 U.S. 135 (2009).
174 One of the first studies to show this was Kenneth R. Mladenka & Kim Quaile Hill, The
Distribution of Urban Police Services, 40 J. POL. 112, 121–24 (1978).
175 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599 (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 51 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993)).
176 See infra text accompanying notes 220–250.
177 One measure of differences in quality is public trust in the police. Careful ecological studies
find that “race remains a significant predictor of perceptions of unjust police practices, even after
taking into account the ecological structuring of neighborhoods and their perceived environmental
context.” John MacDonald et al., Race, Neighborhood Context and Perceptions of Injustice by the
Police in Cincinnati, 44 URB. STUD. 2567, 2567–68 (2007); see also Elaine B. Sharp & Paul E.
Johnson, Accounting for Variation in Distrust of Local Police, 26 JUST. Q. 157, 157–58 (2009)
(finding racial differences after controlling for individual- and neighborhood-level explanations of
trust in police). These studies suggest that differences in police quality disproportionately impact
minority groups. Hudson and Herring, in this light, are, at a minimum, instances of judicial
indifference to the state’s treatment of minorities.
173
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Amendment already draws upon the substantive judgments of state and
national legislatures to calibrate its protections because it implicitly relies on
the substantive ambit of the criminal law. 178 Definitions of probable cause
and reasonable articulable suspicion, that is, already depend on the range of
crimes that a legislature chooses to enact. Narrowing the scope of
substantively criminal behavior makes it more difficult (all else being equal)
for police to conduct searches and make seizures. For example, criminal
conspiracies, even if they are costly to investigate and prosecute,179 may be
a boon to police because their undemanding actus reus requirements make it
easier to obtain a warrant or otherwise justify a search. The incorporation of
substantive criminal law into the Fourth Amendment calculus means that
legislators already have a say about the strength of constitutional
protections. Hinging a judgment of what is reasonable on their acquiescence,
therefore, is in effect a way of giving legislatures two bites at the Fourth
Amendment apple.
In recent decades, moreover, legislatures have not used their
discretionary influence over Fourth Amendment law in a wise fashion, or in
a way that furthers the Amendment’s normative goals. At the federal level,
where the scope of criminal law is most closely studied, it is estimated that
Congress adds about fifty new criminal statutes each year, without
necessarily removing any old ones from the books. 180 Crime rates have not
followed the same steady upward path. Quite the contrary. 181 Legislative
acquiescence to increasing police power is thus not a rational response to
changes in crime rates. Rather, it flows from a bidding war between political
parties striving to compete for a punitive public’s affections. 182 It seems no
coincidence that public attitudes toward crime, and in particular the public’s
178 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781,
802 (2006) (noting that constitutional law makes crime definition “politically easier” than other
mechanisms for altering the nature and scope of the criminal justice process).
179 Cf. William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2028 (2008)
(“[Conspiracy] crimes are more costly to investigate and prosecute than one-on-one criminal
transactions . . . .”).
180 Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1198
(2015).
181 Crime in the United States, 2014: Table 1, FBI: UCR, (Fall 2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crimein-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/Q9TR-TMX8] (describing an
overall decline in violent crimes—murder, rape robbery, aggravated assault—and nonviolent
crimes—property crimes, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft—between 1995 and 2014).
There is little correlation, however, between the rate of legislative supplementation of the criminal
code and changes to the crime rate. This should not surprise: Most crime is likely to be of a familiar
(and already prescribed) kind. By and large, new criminal offenses are not likely to influence such
behavior.
182 For a summary of evidence of the public’s punitive preferences and the bidding war dynamic,
see Huq & Lakier, supra note 79, at 1584–85.
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fear of crime, have not declined—again, quite the contrary. 183 It seems likely
that national politicians’ reckless rhetorical choices have played a large role
in this development. 184 It thus seems most plausible to categorize legislative
behavior as “pathological,” to use a term first deployed by Professor Bill
Stuntz. 185
If one is cynical about the reasons that legislators have for enlarging
each year the scope of substantive criminal law—and there is no shortage of
reasons for cynicism—then the correct response might be to extend Professor
Orin Kerr’s equilibrium-adjustment theory to encompass legislative
changes. Professor Kerr argues that courts should strive to maintain an
equilibrium between the scope of police power and the domain of individual
privacy. He applies his equilibrium-adjustment model to “changing
technology and social practice,” contending that if “new tools and new
practices threaten to expand or contract police power in a significant way,
courts [do and should] adjust the level of Fourth Amendment protection to
try to restore the prior equilibrium.” 186 There is no reason, though, to cabin
the analysis in this way. If courts respond to exogenous shocks such as
technology and diffuse social practice, they should also compensate for
legislative changes to the scope of criminal law. On this view, the
appropriate judicial response to legislative changes in crime policy is not so
much to acquiesce as to resist the pressure imposed on the criminal justice
system by the one-way legislative hydraulic. Such resistance would entail a
countervailing Fourth Amendment ratchet that responds to the dynamic
legislative and presidential politics of crime by incrementally circumscribing
the reach of police power.
It is obvious that this is not the Fourth Amendment that we have. Rather,
our Fourth Amendment has gradually lost force through time, in particular
through the expansion of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
even as the scope of criminal law has expanded. Given the way in which the

183

In the election year of 2016, for example, fear of crime was at rates that had not been seen
since 2001. Alyssa Davis, In U.S., Concern About Crime Climbs to 15-Year High, GALLUP (Apr. 6,
2016),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/190475/americans-concern-crime-climbs-yearhigh.aspx
[https://perma.cc/AF4F-NYQK].
184 John J. Donohue, Comey, Trump, and the Puzzling Pattern of Crime in 2015 and Beyond,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1302 (2017) (concluding that “Comey and Trump probably contributed
to the increase in the public’s apprehension of crime, which likely aided Trump’s law-and-order
candidacy”).
185 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
513–18 (2001) (offering a now-classic political economy account of the inflationary dynamics of
criminal legislation).
186 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 480 (2011).
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federal judiciary closely tracks contemporary political preferences,187 it
seems fair to doubt that a contrapuntal Fourth Amendment law is politically
plausible. Indeed, even at its most seemingly countermajoritarian, the
Supreme Court itself stuck closely to broadly shared views of appropriate
policing. 188 In sum, if we do have a doctrine that moves in rough lockstep
with the increasing punitiveness of legislatures, this is not an example of
“acquiescence”: It is rather a failure of institutional design flowing from the
tight linkage between judicial preferences and the policy judgments of
nationally elected officials.
B. The Burkean Justification
The second argument for using gloss in the Fourth Amendment context
is epistemic. Official practice merits judicial respect, on this account,
because it is a distillation of hard-won wisdom about the tools needed to
suppress crime. Recognition of this epistemic asymmetry requires judges not
merely to adopt a posture of deference regarding specific policy arguments
proffered by the police but also to incorporate the collective, hard-won
wisdom of police agencies into the very fabric of the doctrine. This line of
argument can be discerned in cases that employ gloss as substantive
content—including the misdemeanor warrantless arrest and vehicular search
lines of precedent—as well as those that use gloss as substitute. Even the
gloss as benchmark cases rest on an assumption that wisdom is to be derived
from police practice, but they assume that the wisdom is not evenly spread
across policing agencies.
As plausible as these arguments sound at first blush, they are beset by
deep theoretical and empirical difficulties. To see this, it is necessary to start
with a definition of reasonableness against which the Court’s judgments can
be measured. Consider one possibility 189: An official practice such as
warrantless misdemeanor arrests or warrantless vehicular searches can be
plausibly ranked as reasonable only if its net social benefits are positive.
Under this definition, a policing practice that externalizes greater costs than
187 On the weakness of judicial independence from contemporary political control, see Aziz Z.
Huq, Democratic Erosion and the Courts: Comparative Perspectives, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE
21, 28 (2018).
188 Even in the supposedly halcyon days of the Warren Court, constitutional criminal procedure
doctrine was substantially less countermajoritarian than commonly assumed. See Corinna Barrett
Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1379–82, 1394, 1411 (2004).
189 To be clear, I am not asserting that this is the definition used by the Court, which does not tend
to formulate its analysis in this domain in welfarist terms. Rather, it is my position that net social gain
seems a plausible minimal threshold for what counts as “reasonable” policing. An alternative formulation
might be that the police could reasonably have believed that a practice’s benefits outweighed its costs.
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its benefits is not reasonable. A decision to forego such a practice would
improve social welfare. 190 To demand that policing practices advance social
welfare (however defined) is not to demand that they achieve the maximum
amount of crime suppression, or that they be the best “feasible” approach to
the problem of maintaining social order. 191 It is simply to ask that they help
more than they hurt. It is thus a plausible way of giving some minimal and
uncontroversial content to the inchoate term “reasonable” against which the
Court’s use of gloss can be compared.
With this benchmark in mind, there are three reasons for rejecting the
Burkean justification. First, the political economy of policing—as shaped in
particular by influential actors such as police unions, insurers, and municipal
governments—is inconsistent with the production and sustaining of behavior
that produces greater net benefits than costs. Second, the descriptive premise
of police expertise—which is distinct from police professionalism—is
questionable. To the extent that the case for gloss is epistemic in character,
it requires that officials themselves acquire information upon which to make
sensible judgments. There is scant reason to believe this occurs in the
policing context.
Finally, to the extent that it is the historical durability of a police
practice that attracts judicial deference, the argument from Burkean wisdom
fails to account for the shifting assumptions and justifications that animate
police practice. What seems like a stable practice from one perspective can,
when viewed in light of the changing missions and priorities of police,
appear instead as a multiplicity of tactics sharing only a superficial
connection. Together, these three points substantially undermine the
persuasiveness of a Burkean justification for judicial reliance on gloss.
1. Gloss and the Political Economy of Policing
An unstated assumption of the argument from Burkean wisdom is that
the political economy of policing—that is, the network of social, political,
and institutional vectors that generate police practice—will not predictably
190

I assume a capacious account of costs and benefits that includes the nonmonetized privacy
and dignity values that different jurists have perceived as furthered by the Fourth Amendment.
Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting privacy
as the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment), with id. at 369–72 (Black, J., dissenting) (focusing on
“physical” or “actual intrusion” and dealing with seizures of “tangible[]” items), and Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”).
191 That is, the constitutional analysis is distinct from feasibility analysis in the regulatory
context, in which an agency will “examine only whether a particular level of regulation is
technologically and economically feasible: whether the technological means exist to implement the
regulation, and whether the regulation will cause significant economic harm.” Jonathan S. Masur &
Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 663 (2010).
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embrace practices that impose costs larger than their benefits. My aim in this
Section is to cast doubt on that assumption by focusing on the key
institutional actors whose interests determine the shape of policing. The
observed preferences and incentives of these actors do not conduce, I argue,
to cost-justified policing measures, but rather to measures that predictably
externalize costs without commensurate gains in public safety.
A caution is warranted up front: The idea that policing measures might
be unjustified in pure cost–benefit terms has recently been applied to specific
policing measures, such as stop-and-frisk, 192 and also to the criminal justice
system as a whole. 193 My approach here is not to analyze discrete practices.
Rather, I focus on the incentives of pivotal actors in the criminal justice
system. I suggest that the incentives of these actors are to “overuse the most
punitive and immediately rewarding criminal justice tools . . . and underuse
others . . . which probably generate positive externalities.” 194
The core of my argument here can be stated succinctly: The practice of
policing responds to pressures from police unions, which represent the rankand-file officers themselves; from the management and political leadership
of municipalities (or whatever other jurisdictional unit police are organized
by); and (outside of large cities at least) from insurers. 195 None of these forces
conduces clearly toward compliance with constitutional rules. Indeed, none
of them has a clear incentive to press toward cost-justified policing measures.
As a result, it is exceedingly unlikely that police departments—even if
subject to contemporary forms of management and political oversight—will
endeavor to maximize compliance with constitutional rights or even to
minimize the negative externalities of policing.
Let us start with unions. These have long been understood to be a major
influence on the forms and practices of policing. 196 Rejuvenated police
unions emerged in the 1970s, mobilizing around demands for contractual
192

Huq, supra note 167, at 2413–20.
Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV.
187, 189 (2017) (“In economic terms, criminal justice presents a classic case of externalities,
particularly negative externalities. Individual actors, agencies, and different levels of government
benefit from pursuing individually rational actions but do not suffer the costs they individually and
collectively impose upon others.”).
194 Id.
195 I focus here on the structural, organized forces that shape police behavior. Another lens
would train on demographic changes, although it is not clear that recent changing racial patterns in
hiring have made much of a difference. See David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police
Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1210 (2006).
196 Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 720
(2017) (flagging “a general scholarly consensus that police unions play an important role in policing
and politics”).
193
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protections for officers charged with disciplinary offenses. 197 The collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs) reached by police unions now often contain
procedural protections for internal investigations that impede all efforts to
verify the facts of discrete incidents. Among other measures, these
agreements often delay misconduct-related interviews, allow the accused
access to evidence before being interviewed, bar the investigation of
anonymous complaints, and limit the duration of investigations. 198 These
procedural protections collectively reduce the rate at which allegations of
unconstitutional conduct are identified, increase the cost of investigating
such allegations, and reduce the extent to which police management are both
aware of illegalities and capable of responding to them. 199 Beyond these
systemic effects, there is some evidence that unionization is associated with
a stricter, more coercive form of policing. 200 In short, available quantitative
and qualitative studies of police unionization suggest that this powerful
institutional force will press for institutional practices that maximize the
extent to which the costs of policing are externalized to the public, minimize
information about those externalities, and elicit more aggressive and
coercive tactics.
One might ask whether these forces can be controlled by either
expertise or democratic politics. Managerial controls on the behavior of
rank-and-file officers, to be sure, might in theory be expected to constrain
some of these tendencies. But in practice they are not likely to do so to any
great extent. 201 Empirical studies suggest that management is distrusted by

197 Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important Areas
of American Policing, 9 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 95, 97 (2008); see also Seth W. Stoughton, The
Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2207 (2014) (discussing the spread of
collective bargaining among police and noting that only six states now prohibit such bargaining).
198 Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 224–26; Kevin M. Keenan
& Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law
Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 243 (2005); Stephen Rushin,
Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1222 (2017).
199 Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 798–99 (2012)
(“Collective bargaining rights deter department-wide changes intended to prevent constitutional
violations.”); Huq & McAdams, supra note 198, at 237 (“Delay privileges suppress that information
even within the police department. Absent strong leadership from police management, it is likely
that the signal of low rates of problematic police force will be treated as evidence that police comply
with relevant limits on the use of force.”).
200 John M. Magenau & Raymond G. Hunt, Police Unions and the Police Role, 49 HUMAN REL.
1315, 1330–31 (1996).
201 On the acute separation of rank-and-file from management within police departments, see Akiva
M. Liberman et al., Routine Occupational Stress and Psychological Distress in Police, 25 POLICING:
INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 421, 423, 432 (2002), documenting a lack of rapport and trust. On
street policing culture, see JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF
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rank-and-file officers, especially when it comes to matters of discipline.202
The dispersed and largely unobservable character of street policing also
means that management often lacks information about street-level behavior,
where the majority of costly police action occurs. As Professor Wesley
Skogan has observed, “[m]ost police officers work alone or with a partner,
and the top brass know little about what they do out there except what they
report on pieces of paper that they sometimes fill out to document their
activities.” 203 Typically management responds to this epistemic dilemma by
tracking only outcomes, such as the volume of arrests, that are only loosely
correlated with the cost-justified creation of public order. 204 This is a deeply
perverse metric by which to measure the success of police practice. Arrests
for minor infractions in particular—quite apart from the costs they impose
on suspects—may be unjustified solely in terms of “lost crime prevention
opportunities.” 205 Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the kind of
misdemeanor arrests embraced on the basis of gloss in Atwater have no
deterrent effect on serious crime. 206
The existence of pervasive deficiencies of trust and information implies
that managerial control is likely to be incomplete. There is every reason to
anticipate that information will not be candidly conveyed by the rank-andfile, especially when it concerns potentially tortious behavior that
externalizes costs to civilians.207 Consistent with this prediction,208 larger

LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 33–34 (1968) (finding that police had “a preoccupation with
maintaining self-respect, proving one’s masculinity, ‘not taking any crap,’ and not being ‘taken in’”).
202 See MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS
OF REFORM 9 (1981) (noting that patrol officers “must cope not only with the terror of an often hostile
and unpredictable citizenry, but also with a hostile—even tyrannical—and unpredictable
bureaucracy”). Early sociological work found that street police viewed themselves as a “conflict
group,” working in isolation, and likely came to “regard the public as an enemy” with great speed.
William A. Westley, Secrecy and the Police, 34 SOC. FORCES 254, 256 (1956). The development of
a “quasi-military” style of management in the twentieth century, moreover, has had the “insidious”
effect that managers are perceived as “mere disciplinarians.” EGON BITTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE
WORK 136, 143 (1990).
203 Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 23, 24 (2008).
204 See Michael Tonry, From Policing to Parole: Reconfiguring American Criminal Justice,
46 CRIME & JUST. 1, 12 (2017) (stating that police forces often prioritize arrests over other measures
of performance); accord Stuntz, supra note 185, at 538 (“[P]olice are more likely to maximize
arrests.”).
205 Cynthia Lum & Daniel S. Nagin, Reinventing American Policing, 46 CRIME & JUST. 339,
344–45 (2017).
206 Id. at 353.
207 See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 453, 501 (2004).
208 See Ulrika Haake et al., Police Leaders Make Poor Change Agents: Leadership Practice in
the Face of a Major Organisational Reform, 27 POLICING & SOC.: INT’L J. RES. & POL’Y 764, 764
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police departments seem to experience higher rates of misconduct than small
ones. 209 Larger departments, all things being equal, have more difficulty in
monitoring and regulating the discretionary decisions of line officers. All
else being equal, therefore, we should not anticipate that management will
intervene and limit conduct that is unjustified because it externalizes more
costs than the benefits it creates.
These limits of managerial influence on police rank-and-file, coupled
with the sway of police unions, also constrain the effect of elected officials’
policy preferences on police behavior. Elected officials, after all, whether at
the state or local level, must work through management to influence the
contours of street policing. Today, state laws “cover at best only a small
portion of police management issues and day-in day-out police activities.” 210
In contrast, the historical record of local political control of police
departments demonstrates that police departments were functionally
“[a]djunct[s] of the [political] [m]achine,” and as such were empowered by
patronage and graft. 211 Celebrations of local, democratic influence on
policing fail to grapple with this recalcitrant record, which undercuts
optimism about the valence of democratic policing. 212 Neither state nor local
control of policing, therefore, appears to be robustly welfare enhancing.
Moreover, where we are able to observe directly elected officials’
influence on policing, we do not see a tendency to gravitate toward costjustified outcomes. Rather, there is a bent toward regressive and unjustified
decision-making. A particularly salient body of evidence concerns the
distribution of fiscal resources within states. Spending patterns, which reflect
the aggregate views of many local leaders, can be examined to determine
whether they are better explained by patterns of crime or by the concentration
of racial and ethnic groups. Even in areas where a racial or ethnic minority
has a measure of political control, such as in the American Southwest, studies
(2017) (finding, based on twenty-eight case studies, that “the idea that police leaders will be able to
function as agents of change promoting organizational reform is highly uncertain”).
209 David Eitle at al., The Effect of Organizational and Environmental Factors on Police
Misconduct, 17 POLICE Q. 103, 112–14 (2014).
210 Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of
Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 621.
211 See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 13–19 (1977).
212 For a more optimistic picture of “local justice” that does not pay careful attention to
countervailing evidence, see Stuntz, supra note 179, at 1982–97. Professor Stuntz’s account
mentions the effect of machine politics on urban policing but bizarrely spins these as positive effects.
Id. at 1995–96. The main body of historical evidence, however, “shows in convincing depth and
detail that informal administration, localized politics, and freedom from professional norms
produced dysfunctional systems,” in stark contrast to Professor Stuntz’s partial picture. Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1045, 1050 (2013).
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have found socioeconomic class and proximity to the border—and not
crime—best predict the fiscal allocation of policing resources.213 More
generally, “empirical research also provides considerable support for the
argument that both the resources and the coercive strategies of policing are
distributed in accordance with the racial and ethnic makeup of
communities.” 214
This does not mean that minority communities obtain more or better
protection than majority ones. To the contrary, the rate of civil rights
complaints against police is also a function of the minority (black and
Hispanic) share of the population. 215 Although not dispositive, these patterns
of reported complaints suggest that political control of policing, even if
possible to extend beyond relatively coarse metrics such as funding, would
not necessarily result in cost-justified tactics. Democratic control of policing
more generally cannot be expected to yield cost-justified measures where
there is an observable minority that can be expected to bear the brunt of
negative externalities without being able to change electoral outcomes. 216
Recent literature has turned to the role of insurance companies in
supplying the incentives for police to behave in cost-justified ways. One
commentator suggests that “an insurer writing police liability insurance may
profit by reducing police misconduct” and that “the insurer may be better
positioned than the government to reform police behavior.” 217 But insurers
213 See Malcolm D. Holmes et al., Minority Threat, Crime Control, and Police Resource
Allocation in the Southwestern United States, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 128, 128 (2008).
214 Id. at 129; see also Robert J. Kane, The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct,
40 CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867, 887–88 (2002) (discussing distributions of police force in New York
City between the 1970s and the 1990s and finding increasing usage of disproportionate police force
in minority neighborhoods, particularly when that minority was perceived as a demographic threat
to the majority).
215 Malcolm D. Holmes, Minority Threat and Police Brutality: Determinants of Civil Rights
Criminal Complaints in U.S. Municipalities, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 343, 344–45 (2000); see also Roland
G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Uses of Force 3–4, 7 (July 2016),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/main-july_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M9ZC-FU9Z]
(finding “large racial differences” in police use of “non-lethal force,” including slapping, grabbing,
and pushing individuals into a wall or onto the ground in the Terry stop-related records of New
York’s police).
216 This is true even in minority-majority jurisdictions, where elected and appointed leaders can
be driven by the sheer scale of violence to adopt ineffectual policies, such as massive numbers of
investigative car searches that have “racial discrimination inherent in the[ir] structure.” JAMES
FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 202 (2017); see
id. at 215 (noting the many alternative policies that could have yielded public safety with fewer
externalities). Professor Forman’s larger theme concerns the way in which even well-meaning
minority leaders can be constrained by a variety of exogenous legal and institutional forces and are
thereby forced into deeply harmful policing choices.
217 John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539,
1543–44 (2017).
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are motivated to install loss prevention programs only to the extent that they
anticipate liability. Most cost-unjustified behavior—such as minor uses of
force that leave no broken bones or visible marks or unlawful searches that
generate no lasting damage—will typically not yield tort suits. It seems likely
that many who experience compensable harms do not sue because of the
transaction costs of the civil justice system, to say nothing of qualified
immunity and other bespoke barriers to relief in the constitutional tort
context. 218 If insurers’ incentives to reform are circumscribed by the shadow
of liability, and liability often does not extend very far, then the case for
thinking that insurers will ameliorate unjustified police behavior is
necessarily too weak to be convincing. 219
In short, the assumption that police will elect cost-justified tactics is in
tension with the preferences of rank-and-file police as articulated by their
union representatives in CBAs, the weakness of managerial oversight, and
the limited incentives of both political and private actors to ameliorate
socially unjustified patterns of policing. These forces tend to externalize
social cost in particular to racial and ethnic minorities, rather than pressing
toward cost-justified policing. As a result, the official practice covered by
the Fourth Amendment will often fail to break even in social welfare terms.
If that practice often imposes greater costs than benefits, it is hard indeed to
see why it should be ranked as “reasonable” under any plausible definition
of that term. Observed policing practice is not a reliable source of
information about what is a “reasonable” search or seizure because there is
no reason to believe it will systematically gravitate toward cost-justified
norms. This suggests that the gloss as substantive content cannot be
predicated on Burkean grounds.
2. The Elusive Concept of Police Expertise
A second basis for treating gloss as a distillate of Burkean wisdom
would look to the ability of the police to accumulate and act on information
that only they have access to about the costs and benefits of their policy
choices. The problem with this argument is that its central premise of
epistemic competence is false.
Police departments simply do not collect the information necessary to
make informed judgments on what policies are cost-justified. Rather, as
218

Huq & Lakier, supra note 79, at 1548–56 (documenting barriers to suit).
The leading work recognizes the “theoretical indeterminacy and the lack of any confident
answers to the related empirical questions” of the welfarist claim. Rappaport, supra note 217, at
1596; see also John Rappaport, An Insurance-Based Typology of Police Misconduct, 2016 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 369, 370 (“prob[ing] the limits of the insurance mechanism—the places where the effects of
insurance on policing are likely weak or even perverse, suggesting a need for insurance reform or other,
more familiar regulatory interventions”).
219
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Professor Rachel Harmon has documented, police departments tend to “limit
rather than promote information availability,” and often fail to create or
publicize information that is necessary for sensible regulation of policing. 220
She explains this in terms of the “significant counterincentives” related to
liability and negative publicity that lead police management to “underinvest
in research” that could improve the quality of policing. 221 Even records
generated internally, such as disciplinary documentation, are often hedged
with legal constraints, such as CBA-mandated expungement regimes, that
limit their utility. 222 For example, the authority of internal affairs units to
generate reliable information about police conduct is often constrained by
rules that require them to elicit information only in writing and only after
giving suspects up to a week to respond. 223
Another potential source of information about externalities is the body
of lawsuits filed against police based on federal or state law violations.
Because these suits tend almost uniformly to be indemnified, 224 it would in
theory be simple for the indemnifying government to evaluate how much
police misconduct is costing—although note that even this is just a lower
bound on actual costs, since not all constitutional tortfeasors will be sued.
But even in respect to this one limited set of data, municipalities often fall
short. Extensive research by Professor Joanna Schwartz has demonstrated
that most departments ignore lawsuits that do not generate negative
publicity; that municipal counsel defend most suits without regard to their
merits; that settlements and judgments are paid by the municipalities and not
the department; and that departments fail to keep track of officers named as
defendants, evidence presented against them, or even payouts.225 Hence,
220 Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1129
(2013). For example, more than 40% of police departments nationwide, according to one 2009 study, do
not require any written report when officers use a “twist lock or wristlock” on a civilian. CHARLES R.
EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE
251 (2009) (also noting that only 32% of departments required a report after using a “firm grip” on a
civilian).
221 Harmon, supra note 220, at 1131.
222 Rushin, supra note 198, at 1222.
223 Craig B. Futterman et al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and
Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago Police Department’s Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST.
251, 275 (2008). On the weakness of such units, see G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery
and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 756 (1999).
224 Study after study finds pervasive indemnification of individual officers. See, e.g., Theodore
Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
641, 686 (1987); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014);
Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 810–12 (1979) (reporting government
defense and indemnification of police officers in Connecticut).
225 Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law
Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1037–40 (2010). Professor Schwartz’s
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even when there is a ready, if incomplete, record of actions that plainly fail
to comply with existing legal standards and that externalize costs, police
departments routinely fail to acquire or use that information. The assumption
of epistemic competence upon which the Burkean justification is based,
therefore, falls woefully short of reality.
The fragility of police claims to epistemic advantage is consistent with
recent historical work exploring the origins of judicial deference in the
criminal justice space. The bold assertion of police “expertise” is a historical
artifact of the police professionalism movement of the 1950s. 226 As Professor
Lvovsky’s recent historical scholarship demonstrates, judicial decisions
invoked “the police’s criminological insights as grounds for deference under
the Fourth Amendment” despite a “wealth of research questioning the value
of police judgment.” 227 She describes the emergence of a judicial
understanding of police work “as a task capable of producing rarified and
systematic ‘expert’ knowledge” as a result of judges’ exposure to police as
putative experts and reformers across a range of contexts. 228 On Professor
Lvovsky’s account, the presumption of police expertise has never been based
on a demonstration of actual expertise.
The Burkean justification, in short, can no more be vindicated on the
basis that police are more knowledgeable than on the basis that they are
motivated, all else being equal, by socially desirable incentives and
organizational forces.
3. The Evolving Modalities of Policing
A final problem impedes the Burkean justification. The standard
Burkean argument hinges on the idea that “the past has an authority of its
own which, however circumscribed, is inherent and direct rather than
derivative.” 229 As Burke himself put it, when making “practical” decisions
about “the science of government,” one should be aware that
however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite caution than any
man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any

subsequent research shows that in a small number of jurisdictions, including Los Angeles, Seattle,
Portland, Denver, and Chicago, such information was used as a “valuable source of information
about police-misconduct allegations.” Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits,
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 845 (2012). There is nothing inevitable, therefore, about the failure to use
information that is on hand concerning police wrongdoing.
226 Lvovsky, supra note 22, at 1999–2000.
227 Id. at 2025.
228 Id. at 2053–67; see also id. at 2067–68 (describing the “foundations of judicial deference” to
police as “numerous structural presumptions and aggregate biases refracted through the judicial
process”).
229 Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047 (1990).
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tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up
again without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes. 230

It is, though, to be doubted whether policing is “an edifice which has
answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society.”
Police roles have not been fixed over time, and they have not been focused
on a “common” purpose over their history. Rather, the central task of police
is to solve “problems” in public order as they arise. 231 The nature of the
problems that policing aims to solve, though, has changed dramatically over
time. 232 Consequently, the substance of policing has an evolving, mutative
quality. This is evident from even a rapid summary of the development of
policing since its advent some 180 years ago.
The first police forces, which emerged in cities like Philadelphia and
Charleston in the 1820s and 1830s, took very different trajectories. 233 In
Southern cities, police were primarily tasked with maintaining the practice
of slavery. 234 Through the end of Jim Crow in the 1960s, Southern police
“represented the South’s repressive civil order and the ideology of white
supremacy.” 235 In Northern cities, through much of the nineteenth century,
there were no criteria for becoming a police officer—only “having the right
political connections”—and no training for the job. 236 Urban police
undertook a vast hodgepodge of activities “unexpected by their original
creators,” including returning lost children, shooting stray dogs, enforcing
sanitation laws, inspecting boilers, and conducting censuses. 237 Their roles
were also shaped by national events. We have already seen hints of how

230

Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825, 834 (2008) (quoting
BURKE, supra note 60, at 443).
231 David H. Bayley, Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North
America: Comparative and Historical Studies, 1 CRIME & JUST. 109, 113 (1979).
232 ROBERT C. WADHAM & WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON, TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: A HISTORY
OF POLICE IN AMERICA, at xi (2004) (“[T]he development of American policing is filled with paradigm
shifts . . . .”); accord THE FUTURE OF POLICING (Jennifer M. Brown ed., 2014) (examining current
understandings of policing’s function).
233 SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 51–52 (2d
ed. 1998).
234 Philip L. Reichel, Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type, 7 AM. J. POLICE 51,
51–53 (1988).
235 WADHAM & ALLISON, supra note 232, at 41 (noting that, after the American Civil War,
“modern principles of police officer discipline and discretion” did not apply in the South, but “the
work of the slave patrols evolved into the primary purpose of Southern police”); Sandra Bass,
Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions,
28 SOC. JUST. 156, 161 (2001).
236 WALKER, supra note 233, at 54–55.
237 Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 554 (1992).

750

113:701 (2019)

Fourth Amendment Gloss

Prohibition influenced the Fourth Amendment in cases such as Carroll. 238
Policing more generally changed character both with Prohibition and also
with the early twentieth century’s “rise of a national security apparatus to
ward off external threats and the churn of disorder from anarchists and
criminals.” 239
It was only in the post-World War II years that “police professionalism”
emerged as a dominant approach, with some departments making “notable
progress in raising recruitment and training standards.” 240 Part of the
professionalism movement was a resistance to having police undertake tasks
other than crime control. 241 Advocates of professionalism argued for a more
centralized, quasi-military structure. As a result, the twentieth century saw
changes to police forces’ typical command structures, their core routine tasks
(for example, the decline of foot patrols in favor of motorized patrols and the
specialization by unit within larger police forces), their information systems,
and their demographic composition. 242 This is not to say that professionalism
was an unqualified success. To the contrary, professionalized police proved
quite “unable to respond” to the Civil Rights Movement’s demands for racial
justice. 243 The “primarily reactive” character of professionalized policing
yielded to an embrace of some sort of community policing in the 1960s.244
Today, policing is changing once again as new big-data technologies alter its
deployment and even its aims. 245 Perhaps in another decade or two, what it
means to be police will once again be fundamentally quite different.
238

WALKER, supra note 233, at 158–62; see also supra text accompanying notes 99–105
(discussing origins of the automobile search exception).
239 SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA 48 (2018).
240 WALKER, supra note 233, at 170; see FOGELSON, supra note 211, at 167–92; WADHAM &
ALLISON, supra note 232, at 82–85; see also David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1742 (2005). For a critique of the professionalism movement as “naive,”
see BITTNER, supra note 202, at 361–63.
241 William H. Parker, The Police Challenge in Our Great Cities, 291 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI., Jan. 1954, at 5, 7–8.
242 Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 C RIME & JUST. 51, 59–
60 (1992).
243 WALKER, supra note 233, at 173.
244 James J. Willis, A Recent History of Police, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND
POLICING 3 (Michael D. Reisig & Robert J. Kane eds., 2014); see also LINDA S. MILLER & KÄREN M.
HESS, COMMUNITY POLICING: PARTNERSHIPS FOR PROBLEM SOLVING 20 (4th ed. 2005) (finding that, by
2000, some 87% of forces in the United States had adopted some kind of community policing, although
precisely what this meant varied). The concept of community policing is poorly defined, and I offer no
conclusive definition here.
245 Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144831 [https://perma.cc/X9PZ663N] (summarizing trends). For a survey of nonalgorithmic, empirical tools used by policing of
late, see Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and
Tracking, 42 CRIME & JUST. 377 (2013).
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Given the historical contingency of the policing function, it should be
no surprise that policing organizations now take highly varied forms, 246 much
as they have taken divergent forms over time. 247 The fiscal resources
available for the policing of similar populations in different parts of the
United States can also differ by an order of magnitude. 248 This variance in
underlying fiscal realities directly impinges on the style and manner of
policing. In Ferguson, Missouri, to pick a well-publicized example, court
fines and fees were the second largest source of municipal income. As a
consequence of this reliance, in 2013, Ferguson’s municipal court issued
some 32,975 arrest warrants for nonviolent offenses within a population of
around 21,000. 249 Ferguson is not unique in its reliance on fines and fees
generated by policing activity. 250 But because not all jurisdictions follow
Ferguson’s example, it is wrong to think about policing as a monolithic
species of behavior. Rather, it is to be expected that policing strategies will
vary greatly between different jurisdictions depending on their policing
histories, racial composition, and economic condition.
4. Implications for Fourth Amendment Gloss
A careful accounting of the political, economic, and informationgathering practices of police forces, along with a consideration of both the
historical and current heterogeneity of policing, undermines the case for
Fourth Amendment gloss from Burkean wisdom. Indeed, it suggests that all
three ways in which gloss has been deployed—as substance, as benchmark,
and as substitute—are ultimately theoretically unsatisfying.
To begin with, the objections raised in this Section suggest that official
practice should not be employed as substantive content in the Fourth
Amendment context. The political, economic, informational, and historical
perspectives on policing practices are not consistent with the conclusion that
policing will necessarily involve cost-justified measures. Stable and

246

PETER K. MANNING, POLICING CONTINGENCIES 43–45 (2003) (documenting variations).
WADHAM & ALLISON, supra note 232, at 15 (“A modern police department and a nineteenth
century department may not seem comparable at first glance.”).
248 David Thacher, The Distribution of Police Protection, 27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
275, 291 (2011) (noting disparities and measuring the extent to which they are dampened by federal
subsidies).
249 Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1724 (2015); see also CIVIL
RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_d
epartment_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/78FK-6555] (“City officials have consistently set maximizing
revenue as the priority for Ferguson’s law enforcement activity.”).
250 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1098 (2015)
(noting that “many lower courts and municipalities depend heavily on revenues from fines and fees
imposed on minor offenders”).
247
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commonly used forms of policing, such as the warrantless misdemeanor
stops or the warrantless vehicular searches, cannot be reliably ranked as costjustified merely because they have a long historical pedigree or because they
are commonly used today. In the absence of incentives or institutions to root
out inefficient tactics, there is no reason to think the stock of enduring
policing practices will include only cost-justified measures. 251
These three critiques also suggest a limit to the utility of gloss as
benchmark. To be sure, the mere existence of historical and synchronic
variance in policing practices 252 is not alone enough to preclude an inference
from gloss, as Evenwel v. Abbott suggested. 253 And at first blush, it would
seem to invite the benchmarking inquiry. But as Professors Masur and
Posner have pointed out in the administrative law context, the mere fact that
there is variance among regulated entities does not mean that it is possible to
isolate cost-justified tactics merely by eliminating some outlier practices.254
In both the administrative and the policing contexts, it may well be that an
overwhelming majority of regulated entities are engaged in actions that are
cost-unjustified. In the policing context this seems quite likely. If almost all
police departments are dominated by unions, if they use performance metrics
that are misleading proxies for cost-justified policies (such as the volume of
arrests), and if they fail to acquire or analyze even basic performance-related
data, then I think we should be skeptical of Fourth Amendment gloss as a
measure of minimally good policing.
Worse, when the Court makes the assumption that the modal (or
median) form of policing is a socially desirable one, as in cases such as Mapp
v. Ohio 255 and Tennessee v. Garner, 256 we might be concerned that the
imprimatur of constitutional approval is so persuasive to officials and the
public that it ends reform conversations prematurely. Gloss as
benchmarking, that is, may not only be based on a false premise of epistemic
competence. It may also simultaneously dangerously enervate local reform
impetus.
Historical change in the objects and social understandings of policing,
moreover, poses challenges to the Court’s endorsement of new practices,
such as DNA testing in Maryland v. King, on the theory that they are

251 Many of these critiques apply also to equilibrium accounts of the Fourth Amendment. See
Kerr, supra note 186, at 480.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 233–247.
253 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); see supra text accompanying note 37.
254 Masur & Posner, supra note 127, at 30–33.
255 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
256 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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genealogically rooted in established practices, such as fingerprinting. 257 The
Court’s gloss analogy omits important details that might cast doubt on the
strength of the normative inference that may be drawn from historical
identification practices. The Court did not mention that fingerprinting was
initially adopted by the FBI, and then by police departments, as a way to
manage the new “racially unfamiliar” masses perceived as a menace to early
twentieth-century American society. 258 Nor did it mention the resistance to
fingerprinting as a new intrusion on privacy. In 1920, a Cleveland, Ohio,
ordinance mandating fingerprinting, for example, generated a cab drivers’
strike, with hundreds manning “antifingerprint picket lines.”259 The King
Court’s analysis instead simply assumed that fingerprinting is now and
always has been a neutral, technocratic tool with no racial overtones and no
popular resistance. Yet with a dose more history to hand, DNA sampling
may well be understood in different terms. Like fingerprinting, its initial use
may have racially disparate effects. 260 The earlier discomfort with sharing
fingerprints may be paralleled today by a similar discomfort with sharing
DNA. 261 The Court’s failure to account for these historical parallels—which
would undermine its use of gloss to support lower Fourth Amendment
protections against DNA collection in King—suggest that its use of gloss is
both descriptively and normatively problematic. 262
Finally, many of these same criticisms can be extended to gloss as
substitute. In particular, the variance in the quality of police departments and
the likely persistence of many costly and hence unjustified police practices
257

569 U.S. 435, 461 (2013) (affirming touchstone of reasonableness); see supra text
accompanying notes 123–26.
258 SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION 3, 119–20 (2001).
259 CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA: FROM SLAVERY TO THE WAR
ON TERROR 52–57 (2003).
260 Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court,
127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 189 (2013) (expressing concern about how DNA testing of arrestees will
interact with the “highly disproportionate enforcement of especially low-level offenses”).
261 For some evidence of that discomfort, see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262–
63 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), where Justice Gorsuch discussed governmental acquisition of
DNA from third parties as something that would violate reasonable expectations of privacy.
262 Judicial opinions can also be responses to problems that are unmentioned in the text of the
opinion but are important chapters in American policing. The failure to understand these hidden
transcripts can lead to systematic error in glossing cases. Professor Sklansky has demonstrated, for
example, that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), responded “to the widespread use of a
particularly troubling investigative technique, unrelated to telephone eavesdropping, without ever
mentioning the technique itself. The technique was patrolling for homosexual sodomy by spying on
men in toilet stalls.” David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and
the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 879 (2008). This
understanding puts new light on the idea of “reasonable” expectations of privacy, yet Professor
Sklansky’s vital insight is largely missed in the current scholarship.
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undermine the rationales for across-the-board remedial withdrawal by the
Court in Hudson v. Michigan 263 or Herring v. United States. 264 If police
practice is often cost-unjustified, if assumptions about police expertise are
muddled and in conflict with the facts, and if the wide variance in police
departments precludes broad generalizations, the Court’s blind reliance in
Hudson and Herring on a happy story of ever-increasing professionalism is
unjustified and perhaps even irresponsible.
The Burkean case for Fourth Amendment gloss, therefore, fails.
Whether viewed across time or just today, official police practice cannot be
taken as a normatively justified gloss relevant to the Fourth Amendment’s
interpretation.
C. The Settlement Justification
The settlement justification turns on the social value of a stable, clear,
and readily available focal point to facilitate coordination and evaluation of
government behavior in light of ambiguous constitutional standards.
Because a constitutional focal point can usefully be derived from wellknown historical practice, gloss provides a logical, low-cost coordinating
point to generate a stable constitutional equilibrium. A focal point plays one
function for officials, who must operate within the frame of constitutional
institutions. It has a different function for citizens, who can use gloss to
evaluate whether those actors remain faithful to their constitutional
obligations. In addition, a case for gloss as a well-publicized and readily
referenced benchmark of constitutionality can be derived independently of
any assertion about the quality, or epistemic content, of official practice.
The focal point model of constitutional enforcement by citizens closely
fits the original function of the Fourth Amendment. At its core, the focal
point model addresses a central problem of political theory: A sovereign
must “retain sufficient political support” to remain stable, but in order to do
so, it must persuade citizens that it is not abusing its delegated authorities. 265
Because citizens may disagree on what constitutes abuse, they face a
coordination dilemma: Unless there is agreement on the legitimate bounds
of the state, they will be unable to act together to limit state abuses. Focal
points “resolve [such] coordination dilemmas about the appropriate limits on
the state,” often in terms that generally redound to the benefit of political
“elites,” who are central to political contestation and opposition. 266 The focal
263

547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009).
265 Weingast, supra note 71, at 246.
266 Id. (“To the extent that solutions to the coordination dilemma occur, it is elites who construct
them, often through pacts.”).
264
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point theory can also be profitably read in tandem with Professor Ran
Hirschl’s influential theory of constitutional design as “hegemonic
preservation.” 267 On this view, elites maintain wealth and privileges even
after ceding political power in a constitutional moment by crafting negative
rights that limit the newly formed state. 268
As originally conceived, the Fourth Amendment is plausibly viewed as
a solution to precisely this problem of elite–public coordination over the
appropriate limits of state power. The two English legal precedents that
provided the impetus and template for that provision hinged on state efforts
to use home searches to harass and disrupt political opponents. These
aversive precedents both involved civil actions by opposition
parliamentarians challenging searches of homes and offices by agents of the
secretary of state in search of evidence of sedition. 269 Seditious libel
investigations often relied upon such “general searches for documentary
evidence.” 270 Given this history of policing political dissent through paper
searches, 271 it was eminently sensible for American political elites to agree
on the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches.
Anticipating the prospect of time in opposition, those elites could look to the
Fourth Amendment as a protection against the specific instrument of political
oppression that (to their minds) was most immediately available and
effective. The Amendment is in a sense “really about the protection of
political dissent,” 272 with gloss providing the focal point for social
coordination in the event that elected leaders target such dissent.
If the settlement justification explains the original thrust of the Fourth
Amendment, it does little to explain its operation now. The English
precedents are a gloss that has largely been abandoned. The Court briefly
resurrected the paper searches rule at the end of the nineteenth century in

267 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (2004); see also MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
SUBJECT: SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITY 197–201 (2010) (developing a notion
of “pacted constitution-making” pursuant to which powerful interest groups treat the constitution as
a coordinated truce).
268 HIRSCHL, supra note 267, at 89, 91–92.
269 See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066, 1073 (Eng. C.P.);
Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489 (C.P.); see also William Stuntz, The Substantive
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 397–404 (1995) (discussing the significance of
Wilkes and Entick).
270 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868, at 18 (2006).
271 See Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1066, 1073 (noting that papers are a person’s “dearest
property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection”).
272 Stuntz, supra note 269, at 447.
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Boyd v. United States. 273 Boyd, however, proved to have a limited shelf life
and is no longer compelling as a Fourth Amendment precedent. 274 As a result,
the fact that a search incident to arrest yields intimate papers, such as a diary,
rather than narcotics would have no bearing on the resulting analysis.
Contemporary Fourth Amendment law sharply diverges from the model
of gloss as settlement. To begin with, settlement implies a static model of
official practice that can be used as a basis for drawing Fourth Amendment
law. But when Fourth Amendment gloss is used as a benchmark or a
substitute, official practice has not been treated as static and unchanging.
Rather, the Court treats such practice as dynamic, varying between
jurisdictions and over time. It is only when gloss is used as substantive
content that the settlement explanation is even available: Longstanding
practices accepted as baseline for lawful searches and seizures might provide
focal points for individuals, unschooled in the law, to signal when
government was overstepping its authority.
And yet the Court has not deployed gloss as substantive content in ways
that facilitate coordination among citizens when government oversteps
constitutional bounds. The primary examples of gloss as substantive content,
to the contrary, concern the authorization of practices such as warrantless
arrests based on misdemeanors and warrantless searches of automobiles.275
Neither of these lines of cases provides citizens with clear information about
the limits of state power. To the extent that they rely on the settlement
justification, Atwater, Watson, Carroll, and their progeny might be
understood as focal points for police who are uncertain of their authority.
These decisions thus provide a license for such officers to rely on
longstanding policing habits and practices without reflecting on their
constitutionality. The cases in which I have identified gloss as substantive
content probably lower the cost of policing insofar as they enable junior
officers to rely on the intuitions and habits of older officers. All else being
equal, they allow police to rest on traditional practices. They drain law
enforcement’s incentive to innovate and learn, and—at least to the extent that
the Court has become a primary regulator of the police 276—they undermine
the incentive to innovate and improve policing. A judicial thumb is placed

273

116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (holding that any “seizure of a man’s private books and papers”
violates the Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment(s)).
274 See generally Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L.
REV. 869, 915–23 (1985) (analyzing, and decrying, post-Boyd changes to the law).
275 See supra text accompanying notes 92–105.
276 The role of the Court looms large because relevant “legislation is episodic.” Barry Friedman
& Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1844 (2015).
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instead on the status quo, no matter how dysfunctional. It is hard to see how
this can be justified as a normative matter in the name of settlement.
This is not to say that no paths of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
operate as focal points for potentially effective social coordination in
response to state illegality. The Court has repeatedly flagged a “basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” 277 Home exceptionalism
under the Fourth Amendment, however, is not based on any historical
practice. Rather, it seems to be predicated on an inchoate sense that homes
are distinctive as a cultural or normative matter.278 These cases sound more
in “a nostalgia subsidy for home ownership” rather than any understanding
of what has historically operated as effective policing. 279
In sum, the settlement function of the law is not well served by the
current doctrine. Although the historical practice that once provided the
touchstone of the Court’s analysis could have provided an effectual focal
point, the Court has abandoned that practice as a doctrinal pivot. Its turn to
other forms of entrenched policing practice cannot be justified on settlement
grounds. Indeed, to the extent the Court has become a dominant regulator of
national, state, and local law enforcement, its adoption of the settlement
justification likely engenders worse rather than better policing by crowding
out other reform efforts.
*

*

*

Gloss has been an unacknowledged, yet important, element of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. It shapes the law of misdemeanor arrests, traffic
stops, deadly force, and the scope of the suppression remedy. My aim in this
Part has been to demonstrate that the most powerful justifications for these
deployments of official practice in the Fourth Amendment domain are thin
and ultimately unpersuasive. Separation of powers scholars have shown that
there are persuasive general reasons for relying on interbranch interactions
to formulate constitutional rules. Some of these reasons spill naturally over
into federalism, a congruent domain of structural constitutional law. But
none of the three justifications for gloss can explain the use of official
277 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,
559 (2004)); accord Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).
278 Cf. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 913 (2010) (describing the home as a “sacred site” (quoting
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999))).
279 Aziz Z. Huq, How the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall)
Together, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 139, 157 (2016).
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practice to define search and seizure minima. Such reliance cannot be
explained on the standard grounds for folding in official practice into
constitutional law. 280 Fourth Amendment gloss, in short, stands on fragile
theoretical ground.
IV. THE FUTURE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT GLOSS
If the justifications for Fourth Amendment gloss fail, what
consequences should this have for the actual doctrine? This Part explains
first why Fourth Amendment gloss will persist notwithstanding its lack of
firm normative foundation. Powerful institutional and ideological motives
sustain the judicial practice, I contend, even in the absence of a persuasive
normative justification. In practical terms, this means the problem of Fourth
Amendment gloss is best thought of as a “second-best” problem. 281
Assuming that the Court will not switch to the optimal epistemological
strategy of limited and careful reliance on official police practice, it raises
the question whether there are measures that can be adopted to constrain the
resulting welfare loss. In the concluding section of this Part, I therefore
consider steps to cabin the deleterious effect of Fourth Amendment gloss’s
place in the jurisprudence.
A. The Peculiar Persistence of Gloss
Since it lacks compelling normative foundations, why does gloss persist
as a central tenet of Fourth Amendment analysis? The Court does not explain
why it employs gloss, so it is necessary to infer the Justices’ reasons for
relying on official practice by drawing on circumstantial evidence. I offer
two hypotheses for why gloss has come to play so large a role in the
jurisprudence.
The first reason is quite simple: The Supreme Court has been tacking
rightward since the beginning of the 1970s and President Nixon’s explicit

280

Might there be other wholly new theoretical grounds for using gloss that obtain in the Fourth
Amendment context but not elsewhere? This is theoretically possible, but I can imagine no such
grounds at present.
281 The formal theorem of the second best states that “if there is introduced into a general
equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions [i.e.,
the circumstances that generate Pareto optimal outcomes], the other Paretian conditions, although
still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable.” R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General
Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956). Strictly speaking, the theory of the
second best implies that deviations from optimality undermine the possibility of firm prescriptions.
See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887, 904–
05 (2012). More modestly, the theory implies that when institutions are imperfect, a range of possible
countervailing adjustments must be considered.
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commitment to appoint Justices who shared his views on crime. 282 Today,
the Court’s median lies far to the right of where it has been for most of the
twentieth century. 283 Whatever one thinks of this ideological status quo, it
should be no surprise that the Justices are heavily disinclined to challenge
the authority and competence of the police. Ideological preferences no doubt
make the institutional reasons for folding gloss into Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence more compelling. Hence, they are likely to amplify the neutral
grounds that all judges have for deference to longstanding police practice.
The second hypothesis turns on institutional reasons. Constitutional
jurisprudence is not formulated in the abstract. It is shaped and channeled by
its institutional circumstances and, in particular, by the priorities of the
judiciary. The federal courts have “accreted gradually a great deal of
autonomous discretion to pursue institutional interests” by lobbying
Congress, securing functional autonomy from immediate legislative control,
and crafting doctrinal rules. 284 These interests, moreover, may illuminate
many doctrinal decisions with cross-partisan support, decisions that appear
otherwise mysterious. 285
The Supreme Court depends on police for the implementation of its
Fourth Amendment rules. When the Court announces a rule that governs
street-level police, judicial enforcement of that rule depends initially on
whether officers truthfully report compliance or noncompliance. Much
policing practice is embedded not in formal rules but in “tacit” routines, 286
which are hard for outsiders to grasp or evaluate. If departmental
management has difficulty determining what happens in the context of
dispersed, highly discretionary police–citizen encounters, 287 federal courts
are unlikely to do better. Evidence of pervasive misrepresentation by police
in suppression hearings suggests an additional barrier to judicial

282 Jon Gottschall, Carter’s Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and
Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 168 (1983). See
generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 3–5 (2011).
283 Cf. Alicia Parlapiano & Karen Yourish, Where Neil Gorsuch Would Fit on the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (updated Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/31/us/
politics/trump-supreme-court-nominee.html [https://perma.cc/73WQ-VZ4U].
284 Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE
L.J. 1, 53 (2015); see also David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional
Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2018) (enumerating institutions in which institutional interests have
prevailed over immediate ideological concerns).
285 Huq, supra note 284, at 53–56 (developing this point).
286 On the notion of tacit understandings, see Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Tacit Inference,
41 PHILOSOPHY 1, 2–3 (1966).
287 See supra text accompanying notes 201–203.
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enforcement. 288 Federal courts, further, would have some difficulty tamping
down on pervasive misbehavior by police. In effect, their physical and
institutional removal from police means that they must rely on indirect and
highly imperfect measures, such as suppression and damages remedies, to
elicit compliance from the police. Both of these remedies also curb local
governments’ efficacy as a guarantor of public safety. Remediation thus
comes bundled with its own negative spillovers. Further, it exposes the
courts to political criticism. 289 Hence, the courts are under some pressure to
curtail and control Fourth Amendment rights because of the institutional
costs of Fourth Amendment remediation. 290
To this end, it is in the institutional interest of the federal judiciary to
find an accommodation—a modus vivendi of sorts—with the police. The
judicial embrace of gloss can be usefully understood as one element of that
accommodation. One reason for accommodation is the brute force of
familiarity. Professor Lvovsky has observed that “judges routinely engage in
a casual form of systemic factfinding, synthesizing their discrete encounters
with officers in multiple sites of the justice system [with police] into broader
assumptions about police competence.” 291 Professor Lvovsky’s explanation
may be most plausible for judges who have moved up through the judicial
hierarchy. It may have less explanatory force for Justices of the Supreme
Court, who are quite removed from the daily dynamics of district court
litigation, especially after years and decades confined in the marble precincts
of the apex tribunal.
In my view, the emergence of Fourth Amendment gloss is well
understood in terms of the political pressures on the courts as an institution
to cabin Fourth Amendment remedies, 292 a pressure that obtains even if a
judge has not had a career moving up through the judicial hierarchy. Gloss
purchases breathing room for judges from the costs of Fourth Amendment
remediation (and perhaps because this breathing room is not needed as
288 Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1037, 1042–44 (1996) (discussing a number of related types of police misconduct in connection
with Fourth Amendment requirements, including police perjury at suppression hearings and at trial,
misstatements in police reports, and fraudulent representations in sworn warrant applications).
289 I am not sure whether it is ipso facto undesirable for the Court to be subject to political criticism.
Where, as here, the objects of judicial solicitude have been politically vulnerable groups, though, such
criticism may be as inevitable as it is undesirable.
290 Formal law and economics work models judicial oversight as a solution to an agency cost
problem faced by the public that employs police and that faces the risk of creating police forces with
excessively punitive incentives. Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law
Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 106–07 (2016). The point here is
that judicial oversight of the police embeds its own agency slack problem.
291 Lvovsky, supra note 22, at 2079.
292 The canonical example is President Nixon’s attack on the Warren Court. See supra note 282.
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acutely in respect to other constitutional rights, we do not see gloss being
used with frequency outside the Fourth Amendment to other elements of the
Bill of Rights). By demonstrating respect and endorsement of familiar
policing tools, courts mitigate the potential for conflict with regulated actors.
By making it easier to maintain police “folkways,” 293 courts purchase a
measure of credibility that perhaps makes other rules easier to enforce. If
courts do not have other rules they wish to see enforced against police, they
have neutralized the possibility of pushback from police and their political
allies. 294
Although these institutional and ideological grounds are unlikely to be
formally recognized, they are likely to have powerful shaping effects on the
doctrine. The survival of gloss as a central element of Fourth Amendment
law is one of them.
B. Toward the Mitigation of Gloss’s Costs
The standard account of why Fourth Amendment law falls short focuses
on the limits of courts’ institutional competence. 295 An implication of my
analysis is that the problem lies as much in the sources upon which judges
rely as it does with the institutional limitations of the federal courts
themselves. There is nothing that prevents the federal judiciary from
examining official practice more closely and critically; nothing prevents
Justices who do not obtain a majority, or who are preparing an opinion that
points out weaknesses in the majority opinion, from highlighting the limits
of policing practice. The federal judiciary has the potential to be an effective
shield against unreasonable searches and seizures; it has just chosen not to
play this function. With that in mind, four general lessons might be drawn to
blunt the error-generating effects of gloss in this domain. These lessons are
less costly to implement than a full-scale abatement of gloss arguments;
hence, they are at least plausible reform proposals given the institutional and
ideological dynamics I have identified.
First, it is a mistake for scholars and citizens to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment floor comprises a set of cost-justified policing measures. Even
293 Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory
Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 594 (1998) (“Police departments and
prosecutor’s offices have folkways and patterns of behavior . . . .”).
294 For an illuminating discussion of how police unions in California have mobilized against the
state’s supreme court, see Katherine J. Bies, Note, Let the Sunshine In: Illuminating the Powerful
Role Police Unions Play in Shielding Officer Misconduct, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 130–32
(2017).
295 See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 276, at 1865 (“Even in the case of
traditional, investigative policing, judicial review fails to do its job, the result of which is countless
unremedied rights violations.”).
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common measures, such as warrantless misdemeanor arrests, 296 may be
unjustified simply because their crime-suppression benefits are smaller than
the social good possible if police were to invest their time otherwise.297 If it
is to operate as a source of Fourth Amendment law, judges should
acknowledge that gloss should never be sufficient in isolation to vindicate a
challenged search or seizure. This intuition is not wholly missing from the
Court’s approach. In cases such as Riley v. California, for example, the
majority opinion declined to assume that a practice was cost-justified merely
because some analog to the practice had long been employed by police. 298
The need for judicial consideration of costs and benefits should not be
limited to instances of technological change. All policing tactics are
“technologies” in the most general sense of that term. All were once new. If
no court has ever engaged in the sort of careful analysis that characterized
the Riley Court’s approach, there is simply no reason to assume that
longstanding practice is wise or cost-justified.
Second, and more ambitiously, judges should accept gloss solely if
accompanied either by evidence that the policy is in fact cost-justified, or
that it was adopted through a process whereby its likely costs have been
recognized and acknowledged. This evidence might take one of two forms.
First, judges might accept freestanding evidence that a proposed policing
measure is cost-effective. Police now rarely generate such data.299
Calibrating the deference accorded to different policing measures based on
their empirical support is one way to incentivize the production of such
evidence. In the interim, however, police are not without recourse.
Criminologists have generated an impressive body of empirical scholarship
about the kinds of policing measures that produce gains in public safety that
outweigh the costs externalized onto citizens. 300 A judicial demand for the
actual effect of different search and seizure measures could also serve the
salutary information-forcing function of eliciting more such studies. The
latter are a public good. As such, they are likely to be produced at suboptimal
rates.

296

See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
See supra text accompanying notes 189–92.
298 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
299 See supra text accompanying note 220. States such as Washington have generated benefit–
cost evaluations of policing tactics. Steve Aos et al., The Comparative Costs and Benefits of
Programs to Reduce Crime: A Review of Research Findings with Implications for Washington State,
in COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PREVENTING CRIME 149, 149 (Brandon Welsh et al. eds., 2001).
300 For a recent survey, see Lum & Nagin, supra note 205, at 344. For a compelling analysis of
best practices in street policing, see Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on
Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633 (2014).
297
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An alternative to this approach would be to follow the proposal of
Professors Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko to “defer to police
decisions about enforcement methods only to the extent that those decisions
represent considered, fact-based judgments formulated with democratic
input.” 301 This proposal is not free of ambiguity. On the one hand, their
demand for “fact-based judgments” seems to require that the policies
adopted by police reach a certain quality threshold. On the other hand, they
contend that “[c]ourts need not judge the police, at least in the first instance.
They need only assure that someone is filling the regulatory void.” 302 In my
view, the process by which a policy is generated is an imperfect proxy for
the quality of the policy itself. Where courts can ascertain whether a policing
measure is likely to be cost-justified, I am not sure why they should fall back
on the second-best proxy of procedure. 303
Third, courts should recognize the racial origins of many policing
measures and consider whether those origins are consistent with the
assumption of Burkean wisdom or acquiesced-to settlement. In other
constitutional domains, the Court has acknowledged that formally neutral
policies can be rooted historically in invidious beliefs about regulated
populations. 304 In the policing context, the Court has not evaluated
longstanding practices in light of their racialized origins. It has not
considered, for example, the relationship between vagrancy laws and
programmatic stop-and-frisk. 305 Nor has it questioned whether its
endorsement of professionalized policing in decisions such as Hudson and
Herring is also an endorsement of the racial politics of professional policing
as originally articulated in the 1950s. 306 To finally recognize the racial origins
of many police practices would be a return to, rather than a break from,
tradition. In the interwar years, the Court faced several “egregious exemplars
301
302

Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 276, at 1892.

Id. at 1891.
303 Indeed, in other work, Professors Ponomarenko and Friedman have insightfully detailed the
ways in which cost–benefit analyses of policing now fall short and how they can be improved. Maria
Ponomarenko & Barry Friedman, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Public Safety: Facing the Methodological
Challenges, 8 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 305, 309–10, 312–16 (2017).
304 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227–29 (1985) (holding that a provision in
the Alabama Constitution disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude
violated equal protection where, even though on its face it was racially neutral, its original enactment
was motivated by a desire to discriminate against Blacks).
305 For a fascinating consideration of the historical relationship of these two bodies of law, see Risa
L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links
Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1386 (2010)
(asserting that the Justices perceived them as linked species of policing practice).
306 See supra text accompanying note 243 (noting criticisms of professional policing for its
insensitivity to racial concerns).
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of Jim Crow justice” and used those extreme facts as the basis for “landmark
criminal procedure decisions,” with the aim of limiting the excesses of Jim
Crow criminal justice. 307
Finally, the case against a mechanistic reliance on gloss is at its acme
in cases such as Riley v. California and Carpenter v. United States, which
concern new technologies. 308 Given the variance in the historical functions
and present capacities of police, claims that there is a functional continuity
between earlier policing tools and new technologies are almost always
flawed. Even when such continuities exist—as in the case of fingerprinting
and the DNA analysis authorized in Maryland v. King 309—the Court is prone
to miss the most salient ones. At the same time, the mere fact that a form of
information acquisition was unknown before—and rendered possible by a
new technology—should not suffice to signal its unconstitutionality. 310 The
foundation of Fourth Amendment gloss is sufficiently unstable and the
supply of easy analogies so compromised that new investigative devices
should be judged on their own terms, not by the unreliable and haphazard
project of imagining continuities in the plural, complex worlds of historical
and contemporary police practices.
CONCLUSION
Judicial reliance on actual police practice is commonplace in Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Yet to date it has been neither theorized nor adequately
justified by the Court. Drawing upon analogies to “historical gloss” in
structural constitutional law—and “norming” in the administrative law
scholarship—I have argued that the standard theoretical grounds for reliance
on observed institutional practice do not apply seamlessly in the Fourth
Amendment context. There is, in other words, no strong normative
justification for judicial reliance on police practice to establish Fourth
Amendment rules. To the extent that Fourth Amendment gloss survives,
therefore, it is a mistake, the costs of which must be mitigated, rather than a
virtue to be celebrated. The range of cautionary nudges with which I
conclude is necessarily incomplete. Rather, one implication of my analysis
is that there is much work still to be done thinking through the complex ways

307 Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV.
48, 49 (2000).
308 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); supra notes 118–22 and
accompanying text.
309 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–66 (2013); see supra text accompanying notes 258–259 (flagging the
racialized history of fingerprinting as an investigative tool).
310 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 420 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that it is
“almost impossible” to imagine a historical analog to GPS vehicle tracking).
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federal courts receive and transform flawed policing practice into the basic
law of the land.
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